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LEXICOGRAPHIC CHOICE FUNCTIONS
ARTHUR VAN CAMP, GERT DE COOMAN, AND ENRIQUE MIRANDA
ABSTRACT. We investigate a generalisation of the coherent choice functions consid-
ered by Seidenfeld et al. (2010), by sticking to the convexity axiom but imposing no
Archimedeanity condition. We define our choice functions on vector spaces of options,
which allows us to incorporate as special cases both Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010) choice
functions on horse lotteries and also pairwise choice—which is equivalent to sets of
desirable gambles (Quaeghebeur, 2014)—, and to investigate their connections.
We show that choice functions based on sets of desirable options (gambles) satisfy Sei-
denfeld’s convexity axiom only for very particular types of sets of desirable options, which
are exactly those that are representable by lexicographic probability systems that have
no non-trivial Savage-null events. We call them lexicographic choice functions. Finally,
we prove that these choice functions can be used to determine the most conservative
convex choice function associated with a given binary relation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the publication of the seminal work of Arrow (1951) and Uzawa (1956), coherent
choice functions have been used widely as a model of the rational behaviour of an in-
dividual or a group. In particular, Seidenfeld et al. (2010) established an axiomatisation
of coherent choice functions, generalising Rubin’s (1987) axioms to allow for incompa-
rability. Under this axiomatisation, they proved a representation theorem for coherent
choice functions in terms of probability-utility pairs: a choice function C satisfies their
coherence axioms if and only if there is some non-empty set S of probability-utility pairs
such that f ∈C(A) whenever the option f maximises p-expected u-utility over the set of
options A for some (p,u) in S.
Allowing for incomparability between options may often be of crucial importance.
Faced with a choice between two options, a subject may not have enough information
to establish a (strict or weak) preference of one over the other: the two options may be
incomparable. This will indeed typically be the case when the available information is too
vague or limited. It arises quite intuitively for group decisions, but also for decisions made
by a single subject, as was discussed quite thoroughly by Williams (1975), Levi (1980), and
Walley (1991), amongst many others. Allowing for incomparability lies at the basis of a
generalising approach to probability theory that is often referred to by the term imprecise
probabilities. It unifies a diversity of well-known uncertainty models, including typically
non-linear (or non-additive) functionals, credal sets, and sets of desirable gambles; see
the introductory book by Augustin et al. (2014) for a recent overview. Among these,
coherent sets of desirable gambles, as discussed by Quaeghebeur (2014), are usually
considered to constitute the most general and powerful type of model. Such sets collect
the gambles that a given subject considers strictly preferable to the status quo.
Nevertheless, choice functions clearly lead to a still more general model than sets
of desirable gambles, because the former’s preferences are not necessarily completely
determined by the pair-wise comparisons between options that essentially constitute
the latter. This was of course already implicit in Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010) work, but was
investigated in detail in one of our recent papers (Van Camp et al., 2017), where we
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zoomed in on the connections between choice functions, sets of desirable gambles, and
indifference.
In order to explore the connection between indifference and the strict preference
expressed by choice functions, we extended the above-mentioned axiomatisation by Sei-
denfeld et al. (2010) to choice functions defined on vector spaces of options, rather than
convex sets of horse lotteries, and also let go of two of their axioms: (i) the Archimedean
one, because it prevents choice functions from modelling the typically non-Archimedean
preferences captured by coherent sets of desirable gambles; and (ii) the convexity axiom,
because it turns out to be hard to reconcile with Walley–Sen maximality as a decision
rule, something that is closely tied in with coherent sets of desirable options (Troffaes,
2007). Although our alternative axiomatisation allows for more leeway, and for an easy
comparison with the existing theory of sets of desirable gambles, it also has the drawback
of no longer forcing a representation theorem, or in other words, of not leading to a
strong belief structure (we refer to De Cooman (2005) for a more detailed discussion of
belief models that constitute a strong belief structure). Such a representation is neverthe-
less interesting because strong belief structures have the advantage that their coherent
models are infima (under a partial order implicit in the structure) of their dominating
maximally informative models. This allows for reasoning with the (typically simpler)
maximally informative dominating models, instead of the (possibly more complex) mod-
els themselves. In an earlier paper (Van Camp et al., 2017), we discussed a few interesting
examples of special ‘representable’ choice functions, such as the ones from a coherent set
of desirable gambles via maximality, or those determined by a set of probability measures
via E-admissibility.
The goal of the present paper is twofold: to (i) further explore the connection of our
definition of choice functions with Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010); and to (ii) investigate in
detail the implications of Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010) convexity axiom in our context. We will
prove that, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, for those choice functions that are uniquely
determined by binary comparisons, convexity is equivalent to being representable by
means of a lexicographic probability measure. This is done by first establishing the
implications of convexity in terms of the binary comparisons associated with a choice
function, giving rise to what we will call lexicographic sets of desirable gambles. These sets
include as particular cases the so-called maximal and strictly desirable sets of desirable
gambles. Although in the particular case of binary possibility spaces these are the only
two possibilities, for more general spaces lexicographic sets of gambles allow for a greater
level of generality, as one would expect considering the above-mentioned equivalence.
A consequence of our equivalence result is that we can consider infima of choice func-
tions associated with lexicographic probability measures, and in this manner subsume
the examples of E-admissibility and M-admissibility discussed by Van Camp et al. (2017).
It will follow from the discussion that these infima also satisfy the convexity axiom. As
one particularly relevant application of these ideas, we prove that the most conservative
convex choice function associated with a binary preference relation can be obtained as
the infimum of its dominating lexicographic choice functions.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we recall the basics of coherent choice
functions on vector spaces of options as introduced in our earlier work (Van Camp et al.,
2015). We motivate our definitions by showing in Section 3 that they include in particular
coherent choice functions on horse lotteries, considered by Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010), and
we discuss in some detail the connection between the rationality axioms considered by
Seidenfeld et al. (2010) and ours.
As a particularly useful example, we discuss in Section 4 those choice functions that
are determined by binary comparisons. We have already shown before (Van Camp et al.,
2017) that this leads to the model of coherent sets of desirable gambles; here we study
the implications of including convexity as a rationality axiom.
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In Section 5, we motivate our definition of lexicographic choice functions and study
the properties of their associated binary preferences. We prove the connection with
lexicographic probability systems and show that the infima of such choice functions
can be used when we want to determine the implications of imposing convexity and
maximality. We conclude with some additional discussion in Section 6.
2. COHERENT CHOICE FUNCTIONS ON VECTOR SPACES
Consider a real vector space V provided with the vector addition + and scalar multipli-
cation. We denote the additive identity by 0. For any subsets A1 and A2 of V and any λ in
R, we let λA1 ∶= {λu ∶ u ∈ A1} and A1+ A2 ∶= {u+ v ∶ u ∈ A1 and v ∈ A2}.
Elements of V are intended as abstract representations of options amongst which
a subject can express his preferences, by specifying choice functions. Often, options
will be real-valued maps on some possibility space, interpreted as uncertain rewards—
and therefore also called gambles. More generally, they can be vector-valued gambles:
vector-valued maps on the possibility space. We will see further on that by using such
vector-valued gambles, we are able to include as a special case horse lotteries, the options
considered for instance by Seidenfeld et al. (2010). Also, we have shown (Van Camp et al.,
2017) that indifference for choice functions can be studied efficiently by also allowing
equivalence classes of indifferent gambles as options; these yet again constitute a vector
space, where now the vectors cannot always be identified easily with maps on some
possibility space, or gambles. For these reasons, we allow in general any real vector space
to serve as our set of (abstract) possible options. We will call such a real vector space an
option space.
We denote byQ(V) the set of all non-empty finite subsets of V , a strict subset of the
power set of V . When it is clear what option space V we are considering, we will also use
the simpler notationQ, and useQ0 to denote those option sets that include the option
that is constant on 0. Elements A ofQ are the option sets amongst which a subject can
choose his preferred options.
Definition 1. A choice function C on an option space V is a map
C ∶Q→Q∪{∅}∶A ↦C(A) such that C(A) ⊆ A .
We collect all the choice functions on V in C(V), often denoted as C when it is clear from
the context what the option space is.
The idea underlying this simple definition is that a choice function C selects the set C(A)
of ‘best’ options in the option set A . Our definition resembles the one commonly used in
the literature (Aizerman, 1985; Seidenfeld et al., 2010; Sen, 1977), except perhaps for an
also not entirely unusual restriction to finite option sets (He, 2012; Schwartz, 1972; Sen,
1971).
Equivalently to a choice function C , we may consider its associated rejection function
R , defined by R(A) ∶= A ∖C(A) for all A in Q. It returns the options R(A) that are
rejected—not selected—by C .
Another equivalent notion is that of a choice relation. Indeed, for any choice function
C—and therefore for any rejection function R—the associated choice relation (Seidenfeld
et al., 2010, Section 3) is the binary relation ⊲ onQ, defined by:
A1 ⊲ A2⇔ A1 ⊆R(A1∪ A2) for all A1 and A2 inQ. (1)
The intuition behind ⊲ is clear: A1 ⊲ A2 whenever every option in A1 is rejected when
presented with the options in A1∪ A2.
2.1. Useful basic definitions and notation. We call N the set of all (positive) integers,
R>0 the set of all (strictly) positive real numbers, and R≥0 ∶=R>0∪{0}.
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Given any subset A of V , we define its linear hull span(A) as the set of all finite linear
combinations of elements of A :
span(A) ∶= { n∑
k=1λk uk ∶ n ∈N,λk ∈R,uk ∈ A} ⊆V ,
its positive hull posi(A) as the set of all positive finite linear combinations of elements of
A :
posi(A) ∶= { n∑
k=1λk uk ∶ n ∈N,λk ∈R>0,uk ∈ A} ⊆ span(A) ⊆V ,
and its convex hull CH(A) as the set of convex combinations of elements of A :
CH(A) ∶= { n∑
k=1αk uk ∶ n ∈N,αk ∈R≥0,
n∑
k=1αk = 1,uk ∈ A} ⊆ posi(A) ⊆V .
A subset A of V is called a convex cone if it is closed under positive finite linear
combinations, i.e. if posi(A) = A . A convex coneK is called proper ifK∩−K = {0}.
With any proper convex coneK ⊆V , we can associate an ordering ⪯K on V , defined
for all u and v in V as follows:
u ⪯K v⇔ v −u ∈K.
We also write u ⪰K v for v ⪯K u. The ordering ⪯K is actually a vector ordering: it is a
partial order—reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive—that satisfies the following two
characteristic properties:
u1 ⪯K u2⇔ u1+ v ⪯K u2+ v ; (2)
u1 ⪯K u2⇔λu1 ⪯K λu2, , (3)
for all u1, u2 and v in V , and all λ in R>0. Observe, by the way, that as a consequence
u ⪯K v⇔ 0 ⪯K v −u⇔ u− v ⪯K 0
for all u and v in V .
Conversely, given any vector ordering ⪯, the proper convex coneK from which it is
derived can always be retrieved by K = {u ∈ V ∶ u ⪰ 0}. When the abstract options are
gambles, ⪯ will typically be the point-wise order ≤, but it need not necessarily be.
Finally, with any vector ordering ⪯, we associate the strict partial ordering ≺ as follows:
u ≺ v⇔ (u ⪯ v and u ≠ v)⇔ v −u ∈K∖{0} for all u and v in V .
We call u positive if u ≻ 0, and collect all positive options in the convex coneV≻0 ∶=K∖{0}.
From now on, we assume that V is an ordered vector space, with a generic but fixed
vector ordering ⪯K. We will refrain from explicitly mentioning the actual proper convex
coneK we are using, and simply write V to mean the ordered vector space, and use ⪯ as
a generic notation for the associated vector ordering.
2.2. Rationality axioms. We focus on a special class of choice functions, which we will
call coherent.
Definition 2. We call a choice function C on V coherent if for all A , A1 and A2 inQ, all u
and v in V , and all λ in R>0:
C1. C(A) ≠∅;
C2. if u ≺ v then {v} =C({u, v});
C3. a. if C(A2) ⊆ A2∖ A1 and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A then C(A) ⊆ A ∖ A1;
b. if C(A2) ⊆ A2∖ A1 and A ⊆ A1 then C(A2∖ A) ⊆ A2∖ A1;
C4. a. if A1 ⊆C(A2) then λA1 ⊆C(λA2);
b. if A1 ⊆C(A2) then A1+{u} ⊆C(A2+{u});
We collect all the coherent choice functions on V in C¯(V), often denoted as C¯ when it is
clear from the context what the option space is.
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Parts C3a and C3b of Axiom C3 are respectively known as Sen’s condition α and Aizer-
man’s condition. They are more commonly written in terms of the rejection function as,
respectively: (A1 ⊆R(A2) and A2 ⊆ A)⇒ A1 ⊆R(A), for all A , A1, A2 inQ, (4)
and (A1 ⊆R(A2) and A ⊆ A1)⇒ A1∖ A ⊆R(A2∖ A), for all A , A1, A2 inQ. (5)
Axiom C4 has multiple equivalent forms, which we will use throughout:
Proposition 1. Consider any choice function C. Then the following equivalences hold:
C satisfies Axiom C4a⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ A ,λ ∈R>0)(u ∈C(A)⇒λu ∈C(λA)) (C4a.1)⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ A ,λ ∈R>0)(u ∈C(A)⇔λu ∈C(λA)) (C4a.2)⇔ (∀A ∈Q,λ ∈R>0)λC(A) =C(λA), (C4a.3)
C satisfies Axiom C4b⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ A , v ∈V)(u ∈C(A)⇒ u+ v ∈C(A +{v}))
(C4b.1)⇔ (∀A ∈Q,u ∈ A , v ∈V)(u ∈C(A)⇔ u+ v ∈C(A +{v}))
(C4b.2)⇔ (∀A ∈Q, v ∈V)C(A)+{v} =C(A +{v}), (C4b.3)
Proof. For the equivalences involving Axiom C4a, we will establish the following chain of
implications:
C satisfies Axiom C4a⇒ (C4a.1)⇒ (C4a.2)⇒ (C4a.3)⇒C satisfies Axiom C4a.
To establish the first implication, it suffices to consider A1 ∶=C(A2) in the statement of Ax-
iom C4a, and to consider any u in A1. That (C4a.1) implies (C4a.2) follows by considering
1
λ
> 0 instead of λ. That then (C4a.3) holds is immediate. Finally, to show that (C4a.3) im-
plies Axiom C4a, it suffices to note that (C4a.3) implies in particular that λC(A) ⊆C(λA),
and therefore, by considering any A1 ⊆C(A), Axiom C4a indeed follows.
For the equivalences involving Axiom C4b, we will establish the following chain of
implications:
C satisfies Axiom C4b⇒ (C4b.1)⇒ (C4b.2)⇒ (C4b.3)⇒C satisfies Axiom C4b.
To establish the first implication, it suffices to consider A1 ∶= C(A2) in the statement
of Axiom C4b, and to consider any u in A1. That (C4b.1) implies (C4b.2) follows by
considering −v ∈V instead of v . That then (C4b.3) holds is immediate. Finally, to show
that (C4b.3) implies Axiom C4b, it suffices to note that (C4b.3) implies that in particular
C(A)+{v} ⊆C(A+{v}), and therefore, by considering any A1 ⊆C(A), Axiom C4b indeed
follows. 
These axioms constitute a subset of the ones introduced by Seidenfeld et al. (2010),
duly translated from horse lotteries to our abstract options, which are more general as we
will show in Section 3 further on. In this respect, our notion of coherence is less restrictive
than theirs. On the other hand, our Axiom C2 is more restrictive than Seidenfeld et al.’s
(2010). This is necessary for the link between coherent choice functions and coherent
sets of desirable gambles we will establish in Section 4.
One axiom we omit from our coherence definition, is the Archimedean one. Typically
the preference associated with coherent sets of desirable gambles does not have the
Archimedean property (Zaffalon and Miranda, 2015, Section 3), so letting go of this axiom
is necessary if we want to explore the connection with desirability.
The second axiom that we do not consider as necessary for coherence is what we will
call the convexity axiom:
C5. if A ⊆ A1 ⊆CH(A) then C(A) ⊆C(A1), for all A and A1 inQ.
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As we will show in Section 4, it is incompatible with Walley–Sen maximality (Walley, 1991;
Troffaes, 2007) as a decision rule. Nevertheless, we intend to investigate the connection
with desirability for coherent choice functions that do satisfy the convexity axiom.
Two dominance properties are immediate consequences of coherence:
Proposition 2. Let C be a coherent choice function onQ. Then for all u1 and u2 in V such
that u1 ⪯ u2, all A inQ and all v in A ∖{u1,u2}:
a. if u2 ∈ A and v ∉C(A ∪{u1}) then v ∉C(A);
b. if u1 ∈ A and v ∉C(A) then v ∉C({u2}∪ A ∖{u1}).
Proof. The result is trivial when u1 = u2, so let us assume that u1 ≺ u2.
The first statement is again trivial if u1 ∈ A . When u1 ∉ A , it follows from Axiom C2
that u1 ∉C({u1,u2}). By applying Axiom C3a in the form of Equation (4), we find that
u1 ∉C(A∪{u1}), and then applying Axiom C3b in the form of Equation (5), together with
the assumption that v ∉C(A ∪{u1}), we conclude that v ∉C(A ∪{u1}∖{u1}) =C(A).
For the second statement, it follows from Axiom C2 that u1 ∉C({u1,u2}). By applying
Axiom C3a in the form of Equation (4), we find that both u1 ∉ C(A ∪ {u2}) and v ∉
C(A ∪{u2}), so we can apply Axiom C3b in the form of Equation (5) to conclude that
v ∉C({u2}∪ A ∖{u1}). 
We are interested in conservative reasoning with choice functions. We therefore intro-
duce a binary relation ⊑ on the set C of all choice functions, having the interpretation of
‘not more informative than’, or, in other words, ‘at least as uninformative as’.
Definition 3. Given two choice functions C1 and C2 in C, we call C1 not more informative
than C2—and we write C1 ⊑ C2—if (∀A ∈Q)C1(A) ⊇C2(A).
This intuitive way of ordering choice functions is also used by Bradley (2015, Section 2)
and Van Camp et al. (2017, Definition 6). The underlying idea is that a choice function is
more informative when it consistently chooses more specifically—or more restrictively—
amongst the available options.
Since, by definition, ⊑ is a product ordering of set inclusions, the following result is
immediate (Davey and Priestley, 1990).
Proposition 3. The structure (C;⊑) is a complete lattice:
(i) it is a partially ordered set, or poset, meaning that the binary relation ⊑ on C is
reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive;
(ii) for any subset C′ of C, its infimum infC′ and its supremum supC′ with respect to
the ordering ⊑ exist in C, and are given by infC′(A) =⋃C∈C′ C(A) and supC′(A) =⋂C∈C′ C(A) for all A inQ.
The idea underlying these notions of infimum and supremum is that infC′ is the most
informative model that is not more informative than any of the models in C′, and supC′
the least informative model that is not less informative than any of the models in C′.
We have proved elsewhere (Van Camp et al., 2017, Proposition 3) that coherence is
preserved under arbitrary non-empty infima. Because of our interest in the additional
Axiom C5, we prove that it also is preserved under arbitrary non-empty infima.
Proposition 4. Given any non-empty collection C′ of choice functions that satisfy Ax-
iom C5, its infimum infC′ satisfies Axiom C5 as well.
Proof. Consider any A and A1 inQ such that A ⊆ A1 ⊆CH(A). Then C(A) ⊆C(A1) for
all C in C′, whence infC′(A) =⋃C∈C′ C(A) ⊆⋃C∈C′ C(A1) = infC′(A1). 
3. THE CONNECTION WITH OTHER DEFINITIONS OF CHOICE FUNCTIONS
Before we go on with our exploration of choice functions, let us take some time here to
explain why we have chosen to define them in the way we did. Seidenfeld et al. (2010) (see
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also Kadane et al., 2004) define choice functions on horse lotteries, instead of options, as
this helps them generalise the framework established by Anscombe and Aumann (1963)
for binary preferences to non-binary ones.
One reason for our working with the more abstract notion of options—elements of
some general vector space—is that they are better suited for dealing with indifference:
this involves working with equivalence classes of options, which again constitute a vector
space (Van Camp et al., 2017). These equivalence classes can no longer be interpreted
easily or directly as gambles, or horse lotteries for that matter. Another reason for using
options that are more general than real-valued gambles is that recent work by Zaffalon
and Miranda (2015) has shown that a very general theory of binary preference can
be constructed using vector-valued gambles, rather than horse lotteries. Such vector-
valued gambles again constitute a real vector, or option, space. Here, we show that the
conclusions of Zaffalon and Miranda (2015, Section 4) can be extended from binary
preferences to choice functions.
We consider an arbitrary possibility spaceX of mutually exclusive elementary events,
one of which is guaranteed to occur. Consider also a countable setR of prizes, or rewards.
Definition 4 (Gambles). Any bounded real-valued function on some domainX is called
a gamble onX . We collect all gambles onX in L(X ), often denoted as Lwhen it is clear
from the context what the domainX is.
When the domain is of the typeX ×R, we call elements f ofL(X ×R) vector-valued
gambles onX . Indeed, for each x inX , the partial map f (x, ⋅) is then an element of the
vector space L(R).
The set L, provided with the point-wise addition of gambles, the point-wise multipli-
cation with real scalars, and the point-wise vector ordering ≤, constitutes an ordered
vector space. We call L>0 ∶= { f ∈L ∶ f > 0} = { f ∈L ∶ f ≥ 0 and f ≠ 0} the set of all positive
(vector-valued) gambles.
Horse lotteries are special vector-valued gambles.
Definition 5 (Horse lotteries). We call horse lottery H any map fromX ×R to [0,1] such
that for all x inX , the partial map H(x, ⋅) is a probability mass function overR:1
(∀x ∈X )(∑
r∈RH(x,r) = 1 and (∀r ∈R)H(x,r) ≥ 0).
We collect all the horse lotteries on X with reward set R in H(X ,R), which is also
denoted more simply byH when it is clear from the context what the possibility spaceX
and reward setR are.
Let us, for the remainder of this section, fix X andR. It is clear thatH ⊆L(X ×R).
Seidenfeld et al. (2010) consider choice functions whose domain is Q(H), the set of
all finite subsets of H—choice functions on horse lotteries.2 We will call them choice
functions on H. Because of the nature of H, their choice functions are different from
ours: they require slightly different rationality axioms. The most significant change is
that for Seidenfeld et al. (2010), choice functions need not satisfy Axioms C4a and C4b.
In fact, choice functions onH cannot satisfy these axioms, sinceH is no linear space:
it is not closed under arbitrary linear combinations, only under convex combinations.
Instead, on their approach a choice function C∗ onH is required to satisfy
C∗4 . A∗1 ⊲C∗ A∗2 ⇔αA∗1 +(1−α){H} ⊲C∗ αA∗2 +(1−α){H} for all α in (0,1], all A∗1 and
A∗2 inQ(H) and all H inH.
1Note that H(x, ⋅) defines a (sigma-)additive probability measure, and that this countable additivity prop-
erty is necessary for Lemma 6 below to hold.
2Actually, Seidenfeld et al. (2010) define choice functions on a larger domain: all possibly infinite but closed
sets of horse lotteries (non-closed sets may not have admissible options). This is an extension we see no need
for in the present context.
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The binary relation ⊲C∗ is the choice relation associated with C∗, defined by Equation (1).
Furthermore, for a choice function C∗ to be coherent, it needs to additionally satisfy (Sei-
denfeld et al., 2010):
C∗1 . C∗(A∗) ≠∅ for all A∗ inQ(H);
C∗2 . for all A∗ in Q(H), all H1 and H2 in H such that H1(⋅,⊺) ⪯ H2(⋅,⊺) and H1(⋅,r) =
H2(⋅,r) = 0 for all r inR∖{,⊺}, and all H inH∖{H1, H2}:
a. if H2 ∈ A∗ and H ∈R∗({H1}∪ A∗) then H ∈R∗(A∗);
b. if H1 ∈ A∗ and H ∈R∗(A∗) then H ∈R∗({H2}∪ A∗∖{H1});
C∗3 . for all A∗, A∗1 and A∗2 inQ(H):
a. if A∗1 ⊆R∗(A∗2 ) and A∗2 ⊆ A∗ then A∗1 ⊆R∗(A);
b. if A∗1 ⊆R∗(A∗2 ) and A∗ ⊆ A∗1 then A∗1 ∖ A∗ ⊆R∗(A∗2 ∖ A);
C∗5 . if A∗ ⊆ A∗1 ⊆CH(A) then C∗(A) ⊆C∗(A∗1 ), for all A∗ and A∗1 inQ(H);
C∗6 . for all A∗, A∗′, A∗′′ A∗i ′ and A∗i ′′ (for i in N) inQ(H) such that the sequence A∗i ′
converges point-wise to A∗′ and the sequence A∗i ′′ converges point-wise to A∗′′:
a. If (∀i ∈N)A∗i ′′ ⊲C∗ A∗i ′ and A∗′ ⊲C∗ A∗ then A∗′′ ⊲C∗ A∗;
b. If (∀i ∈N)A∗i ′′ ⊲C∗ A∗i ′ and A∗ ⊲C∗ A∗′′ then A∗ ⊲C∗ A∗′,
where Seidenfeld et al. (2010) assume that there is a unique worst reward  and a unique
best reward ⊺ inR. This is a somewhat stronger assumption than we will make: further
on in this section, we will only assume that there is a unique worst reward. Axiom C∗2 is
the counterpart of Proposition 2 for choice functions on horse lotteries, which is a result
of our Axioms C1–C4. Seidenfeld et al. (2010) need to impose this property as an axiom,
essentially because of the absence in their system of a counterpart for our Axiom C2.
Axioms C∗6 a and C∗6 b are Archimedean axioms, hard to reconcile with desirability (see for
instance Zaffalon and Miranda, 2015, Section 4), which is why will not enforce them here.
We now intend to show that under very weak conditions on the rewards setR, choice
functions on horse lotteries that satisfy C∗4 are in a one-to-one correspondence with
choice functions on a suitably defined option space that satisfy Axioms C4a and C4b.
Let us first study the impact of Axiom C∗4 . We begin by showing that an assessment of
H ∈C(A) for some A inQ(H) implies other assessments of this type.
Proposition 5. Consider any choice function C∗ onQ(H) that satisfies Axiom C∗4 , any
option sets A∗ and A∗′ inQ(H), and any H in A∗ and H ′ in A∗′. If there are λ and λ′ in
R>0 such that λ(A∗−{H}) =λ′(A∗′−{H ′}), then
H ∈C∗(A)⇔H ′ ∈C∗(A∗′).
Proof. Fix A∗ and A∗′ inQ(H), H in A∗ and H ′ in A∗′, λ and λ′ in R>0, and assume that
λ(A∗−{H}) =λ′(A∗′−{H ′}). We will show that H ∈R∗(A∗)⇔H ′ ∈R∗(A∗′). We infer
from the assumption that
λ
λ+λ′ A∗+ λ′λ+λ′ {H ′} = λ′λ+λ′ A∗′+ λλ+λ′ {H}.
If we call α ∶= λ
λ+λ′ to ease the notation along, then 1−α = λ′λ+λ′ and α ∈ (0,1). We now
infer from the identity above that αA∗+(1−α){H ′} = (1−α)A∗′+α{H}. Consider the
following chain of equivalences:
H ∈R∗(A∗)⇔ {H} ⊲C∗ A∗ by Equation (1)⇔α{H}+(1−α){H ′} ⊲C∗ αA∗+(1−α){H ′} using Axiom C∗4⇔α{H}+(1−α){H ′} ⊲C∗ (1−α)A∗′+α{H}⇔ {H ′} ⊲C∗ A∗′ using Axiom C∗4⇔H ′ ∈R∗(A∗′) by Equation (1). 
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For any r inR, we now introduceRr ∶=R∖{r}, the set of all rewards without r . For the
connection between choice functions onH and choice functions on some option space,
we need to somehow be able to extendH to a linear space. The so-called gamblifier ϕr
will play a crucial role in this:
Definition 6 (Gamblifier). Consider any r inR. The gamblifier ϕr is the linear map
ϕr ∶L(X ×R)→L(X ×Rr )∶ f ↦ϕr f ,
where ϕr f (x, s) ∶= f (x, s) for all x inX and s inRr .
In particular, the gamblifier ϕr maps any horse lottery H inH(X ,R) to an element ϕr H
ofL(X ×Rr ) that satisfies the following two conditions:
ϕr H(⋅, ⋅) ≥ 0 and ∑
s∈Rr ϕr H(⋅, s) ≤ 1. (6)
Application ofϕr to sets of the form λ(A∗−{H}) essentially leaves the ‘information’ they
contain unchanged:
Lemma 6. Consider any r inR. Then the following two properties hold:
(i) The gamblifier ϕr is one-to-one onH.
(ii) For any A∗ and A∗′ inQ(H), any H in A∗ and H ′ in A∗′ and any λ and λ′ in R>0:
λ(A∗−{H}) =λ′(A∗′−{H ′})⇔ϕr (λ(A∗−{H})) =ϕr (λ′(A∗′−{H ′})).
Proof. We begin with the first statement. Consider any H and H ′ inH, and assume that
ϕr (H) =ϕr (H ′). We infer from Definition 6 that
H(x, s) = H ′(x, s) for all x inX and s inRr ,
and therefore also, since H and H ′ are horse lotteries,
H(x,r) = 1− ∑
s∈Rr H(x, s) = 1− ∑s∈Rr H ′(x, s) = H ′(x,r) for all x inX .
Hence indeed H = H ′.
The direct implication in the second statement is trivial; let us prove the converse.
Assume that ϕr (λ(A∗ − {H})) = ϕr (λ′(A∗′ − {H ′})). We may write, without loss of
generality, that A∗ = {H, H1, . . . , Hn} and A∗′ = {H ′, H ′1, . . . , H ′m} for some n and m in N.
Now, consider any element Hi in A
∗, then ϕr (λ(Hi −H)) ∈ϕr (λ(A∗−{H})). Consider
any j in {1, . . . ,m} such that ϕr (λ(Hi −H)) = ϕr (λ′(H ′j −H ′)). It follows from the as-
sumption that there is at least one such j . The proof is complete if we can show that
λ(Hi −H) =λ′(H ′j −H ′). By Definition 6, we already know that
λ(Hi (⋅, s)−H(⋅, s)) =λ′(H ′j (⋅, s)−H ′(⋅, s)) for all s inRr ,
and therefore, since H, H ′, Hi and H ′j are horse lotteries, also
λ(Hi (⋅,r)−H(⋅,r)) =λ( ∑
s∈Rr H(⋅, s)− ∑s∈Rr Hi (⋅, s)) = ∑s∈Rr λ(H(⋅, s)−Hi (⋅, s))= ∑
s∈Rr λ
′(H ′(⋅, s)−H ′j (⋅, s)) =λ′( ∑
s∈Rr H
′(⋅, s)− ∑
s∈Rr H
′
j (⋅, s))
=λ′(H ′j (⋅,r)−H ′(⋅,r)),
whence indeed λ(Hi −H) =λ′(H ′j −H ′). 
We now lift the gamblifier ϕr to a map ϕ˜r that turns choice functions on gambles into
choice functions on horse lotteries:
ϕ˜r ∶C(L(X ×Rr ))→ C(H(X ,R))∶C ↦ ϕ˜r C , (7)
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where ϕ˜r C(A∗) ∶= ϕ−1r C(ϕr A∗) for every A∗ in Q(H(X ,R)). This definition makes
sense because we have proved in Lemma 6 that ϕr is one-to-one onH, and therefore
invertible on ϕrH. The result of applying ϕ˜r to a choice function C on L(X ×Rr ) is a
choice function ϕ˜r C onH(X ,R). Observe that we can equally well make ϕ˜r apply to
rejection functions R , and that for every A∗ inQ(H(X ,R)):
ϕ˜r R(A∗) ∶=ϕ−1r R(ϕr A∗) =ϕ−1r (ϕr A∗∖C(ϕr A∗)) = A∗∖ϕ−1r C(ϕr A∗) = A∗∖ ϕ˜r C(A∗),
so ϕ˜r R is the rejection function associated with the choice function ϕ˜r C , when R is the
rejection function for C .
One property of the transformation ϕ˜r that will be useful in our subsequent proofs is
the following:
Lemma 7. Consider any r inR and any A inQ(L(X ×Rr )), and define g by g(x, s) ∶=∑ f ∈A ∣ f (x, s)∣ for all x inX and s inRr . Consider any λ in R such that
λ >max{max
x∈X ∑s∈Rr h(x, s) ∶ h ∈ A+{g}} ≥ 0.
Then 1
λ
(A +{g}) =ϕr A∗ for some A∗ inQ(H(X ,R)).
Proof. Consider any h in A +{g}, and let us show that 1
λ
h satisfies the conditions in
Equation (6). The first one is satisfied because λ > 0 and h = f + g for some f in A , so
h = f +g = f +∑ f ′∈A ∣ f ′∣ ≥ f +∣ f ∣ ≥ 0 and therefore indeed 1λh ≥ 0. For the second condition,
recall that λ ≥∑s∈Rr h(⋅, s) by construction and therefore indeed∑s∈Rr 1λh(⋅, s) ≤ 1. 
Proposition 8. Consider any r in R. The operator ϕ˜r is a bijection between the choice
functions on L(X ×Rr ) that satisfy Axioms C4a and C4b, and the choice functions onH(X ,R) that satisfy Axiom C∗4 .
Proof. We first show that ϕ˜r is injective. Assume ex absurdo that it is not, so there are
choice functions C and C ′ on L(X ×Rr ) that satisfy Axioms C4a and C4b, such that
ϕ˜r C = ϕ˜r C ′ but nevertheless C ≠C ′. The latter means that there are A inQ(L(X ×Rr ))
and f in A such that f ∈C(A) and f ∉C ′(A). Use Lemma 7 to find some λ in R>0 and g
inL(X ×Rr ) such that 1λ(A+{g}) =ϕr A∗ for some A∗ inQ(H(X ,R)). If we now apply
Axioms C4a and C4b we find that
f +g
λ
∈ C( 1
λ
(A + {g})), or equivalently, ϕ−1r ( f +gλ ) ∈
ϕ˜r C(A∗). Similarly, we find that f +gλ ∉ C ′( 1λ(A + {g})), or equivalently, ϕ−1r ( f +gλ ) ∉
ϕ˜r C
′(A∗). But this contradicts our assumption that ϕ˜r C = ϕ˜r C ′.
We now show that application of ϕ˜r to any choice function C on L(X ×Rr ) that
satisfies Axioms C4a and C4b, results in a choice function ϕ˜C that satisfies Axiom C∗4 .
Consider any A∗1 and A∗2 inQ(H(X ,R)), any H inH(X ,R), and any α in (0,1]. Infer
the following chain of equivalences:
A∗1 ⊲ϕ˜r C A∗2⇔ A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜r R(A∗1 ∪ A∗2 ) by Equation (1)⇔ϕr A∗1 ⊆R(ϕr (A∗1 ∪ A∗2 )) by Equation (7)⇔ϕrαA∗1 ⊆R(ϕrα(A∗1 ∪ A∗2 )) by Axiom C4a⇔ϕr (αA∗1 +(1−α){H}) ⊆R(ϕr (α(A∗1 ∪ A∗2 )+(1−α){H})) by Axiom C4b⇔αA∗1 +(1−α){H} ⊆ ϕ˜r R(α(A∗1 ∪ A∗2 )+(1−α){H}) by Equation (7)⇔ (αA∗1 +(1−α){H}) ⊲ϕ˜r C (αA∗2 +(1−α){H}) by Equation (1),
which tells us that indeed ϕ˜r C satisfies Axiom C
∗
4 .
The proof is complete if we also show that ϕ˜r is surjective—that for every choice
function C∗ onH(X ,R) that satisfies Axiom C∗4 , there is a choice function C onL(X ×Rr ) that satisfies Axioms C4a and C4b such that ϕ˜r C = C∗. So consider any choice
LEXICOGRAPHIC CHOICE FUNCTIONS 11
function C∗ onH(X ,R) that satisfies Axiom C∗4 . We will show that the special choice
function C onL(X ×Rr ) based on C∗, defined as
f ∈C(A)⇔ (∃λ ∈R>0, A∗ ∈Q(H(X ,R)), H ∈ A∗)(ϕr (A∗−{H}) =λ(A −{ f }) and H ∈C∗(A∗)) (8)
for all A inQ(L(X ×Rr )) and f in A , satisfies Axioms C4a and C4b and ϕ˜r C =C∗. We
first show that C satisfies Axioms C4a and C4b. For Axiom C4a, we use its equivalent
form (C4a.1). Consider any A in Q(L(X ×Rr )), any f in A , and any µ in R>0, and
assume that f ∈C(A). To show that then µ f ∈C(µA), it suffices to consider λ′ ∶= λ
µ
in
Equation (8), and note that λ(A − { f }) = λ′(µA − {µ f }); then the desired statement
follows at once from Equation (8). For Axiom C4b, we use its equivalent form (C4b.1).
Consider any A in Q(L(X ×Rr )), any f in A , and any g in L(X ×Rr ), and assume
that f ∈C(A). We show that then f + g ∈C(A +{g}). To this end, it suffices to note that
A−{ f } = (A+{g})−{ f +g}; then the desired statement follows at once from Equation (8).
So C as defined in Equation (8) does indeed satisfy Axioms C4a and C4b, and is therefore
a suitable candidate for showing that ϕ˜r C =C∗.
We now finish the proof by showing that ϕ˜r C =C∗. To do so, we consider any A∗ inQ(H(X ,R)), and show that ϕ˜r C(A∗) ⊆C∗(A∗) and C∗(A∗) ⊆ ϕ˜r C(A∗). To show that
ϕ˜r C(A∗) ⊆C∗(A∗), consider any H in ϕ˜r C(A∗). By the definition of ϕ˜r (Equation (7))
then H ∈ ϕ−1r (C(ϕr A∗)), and therefore ϕr H ∈ C(ϕr A∗). Using Equation (8) [with A =
ϕr A
∗ and f =ϕr H], we find that then
ϕr (A∗′−{H ′}) =λ′(ϕr A∗−{ϕr H}) and H ′ ∈C∗(A∗′)
for some λ′ in R>0, A∗′ inQ(H(X ,R)) and H ′ ∈ A∗′. By Lemma 6 and since λ′(ϕr A∗−{ϕr H}) =ϕr (λ′(A∗−{H})), infer that then
A∗′−{H ′} =λ′(A∗−{H}) and H ′ ∈C∗(A∗′),
and because C∗ satisfies Axiom C∗4 , and using Proposition 5 this means that indeed
H ∈C∗(A∗). So we have shown that H ∈C∗(A∗), and since the choice of H was arbitrary
in ϕ˜r C(A∗), therefore indeed ϕ˜r C(A∗) ⊆C∗(A∗).
To show that C∗(A∗) ⊆ ϕ˜r C(A∗), consider any H in C∗(A∗). Let A ∶=ϕr A∗, f ∶=ϕr H
and λ ∶= 1, then
ϕr (A∗−{H}) =λ(A −{ f }),
whence by Equation (8) ϕr H = f ∈C(A) =C(ϕr A∗). Since ϕr is one-to-one onH(X ,R)
(see Lemma 6), therefore indeed H ∈ ϕ˜r C(A∗). So we have shown that ϕ˜r C =C∗, which
completes the proof. 
Specifying a choice function C∗ onH induces a strict preference relation on the reward
set, as follows. With any reward r in R we can associate the constant and degenerate
lottery Hr by letting
Hr (x, s) ∶={1 if s = r
0 otherwise
for all x inX and s inR.
This is the lottery that associates the certain reward r with all states. Then a reward r is
strictly preferred to a reward s when Hs ∈R∗({Hr , Hs}).
Definition 7 (C∗ has worst reward r ). Consider any reward r in R, and any choice
function C∗ onH(X ,R). We say that C∗ has worst reward r if Hr ∈R∗({H, Hr }) for all
H inH(X ,R)∖{Hr }.
The worst reward is unique when C∗ satisfies Axiom C∗1 : indeed, if there are two different
worst rewards r and s, by Definition 7 then {Hr , Hs} = R∗({Hr , Hs}), contradicting
Axiom C∗1 .
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The notion of having worst reward is closely related with what would be the natural
translation of Axiom C2 to choice functions C
∗ onH(X ,R): if C∗ satisfies(∀H1, H2 ∈H)((H1 ≠ H2 and (∀s ∈Rr )(H1(⋅, s) ≤ H2(⋅, s)))⇒H1 ∈R∗({H1, H2}))
(9)
for some r inR, then we say that C∗ satisfies the dominance relation for worst reward r .
Proposition 9. Consider any r inR and any choice function C onL(X ×Rr ) that satisfies
Axiom C4b. Then ϕ˜r C satisfies the dominance relation for worst reward r (Equation (9)) if
and only if ϕ˜r C has worst reward r .
Proof. For the direct implication, consider any H inH(X ,R)∖{Hr }. Then Hr (⋅, s) = 0 ≤
H(⋅, s) for all s inRr , and also H ≠ Hr , whence indeed Hr ∈ ϕ˜r R({H, Hr }), because by
assumption ϕ˜r C satisfies Equation (9) for r .
For the converse implication, consider any H1 and H2 in H(X ,R) such that H1 ≠
H2 and H1(⋅, s) ≤ H2(⋅, s) for all s in Rr . Then ϕr H1 < ϕr H2, whence 0 < ϕr (H2 −H1).
Observe that for the horse lottery H ′ inH(X ,R) defined by
H ′(⋅, s) ∶={H2(⋅, s)−H1(⋅, s) if s ∈Rr
1−∑s∈Rr (H2(⋅, s)−H1(⋅, s)) if s = r ,
we have that ϕr H
′ = ϕr (H2 −H1). Because ϕ˜r C is assumed to have worst reward r ,
we know that in particular Hr ∈ ϕ˜r R({H ′, Hr }), so we infer from Equation (7) that
0 = ϕr Hr ∈ R({ϕr Hr ,ϕr H ′}) = R({0,ϕr H2 −ϕr H1}). Now use Axiom C4b to infer that
ϕr H1 ∈R({ϕr H1,ϕr H2}), whence indeed H1 ∈ ϕ˜r R({H1, H2}), by Equation (7). 
Applying the lifting ϕ˜r furthermore preserves coherence:
Theorem 10. Consider any reward r inR, and any choice function C on L(X ×Rr ) that
satisfies Axioms C4a and C4b. Then the following statements hold:
(i) C satisfies Axiom C1 if and only if ϕ˜r C satisfies Axiom C
∗
1 ;
(ii) C satisfies Axiom C2 if and only if ϕ˜r C has worst reward r ;
(iii) C satisfies Axiom C3a if and only if ϕ˜r C satisfies Axiom C
∗
3 a;
(iv) C satisfies Axiom C3b if and only if ϕ˜r C satisfies Axiom C
∗
3 b;
(v) ϕ˜r C satisfies Axiom C
∗
4 ;
(vi) C satisfies Axiom C5 if and only if ϕ˜r C satisfies Axiom C
∗
5 .
Proof. For the direct implication of (i), assume that C satisfies Axiom C1. Consider any
A∗ inQ(H(X ,R)). Then ϕ˜r C(A∗) =ϕ−1r C(ϕr A) ≠∅.
For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜r C satisfies Axiom C
∗
1 . Consider any
A in Q(L(X ×Rr )). By Lemma 7, there are λ in R>0 and g in L(X ×Rr ) such that
1
λ
(A+{g}) =ϕr A∗ for some A∗ inQ(H(X ,R)). Applying Axioms C4a and C4b and the
definition of ϕ˜r [Equation (7)], we infer that indeed
C(A) =λC( 1
λ
(A +{g}))−{g} =λC(ϕr A∗)−{g} =λϕr ϕ˜r C(A∗)−{g} ≠∅.
For the direct implication of (ii), assume that C satisfies Axiom C2. Consider any H1
and H2 inH(X ,R) such that H1 ≠ H2 and H1(⋅, s) ≤ H2(⋅, s) for all s inRr . Then ϕr H1 <
ϕr H2, so Axiom C2 guarantees that ϕr H1 ∈ R({ϕr H1,ϕr H2}). Equation (7) now turns
this into H1 ∈ ϕ˜r R({H1, H2}). Proposition 9 now tells us that ϕ˜r C has worst reward r .
For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜r C has worst reward r . Consider any f1
and f2 inL(X ×Rr ) such that f1 < f2. Let
λ ∶=max
x∈X ∑s∈Rr( f2(x, s)− f1(x, s)) > 0.
Then clearly 1
λ
( f2− f1) =ϕr H for some H inH(X ,R). Also, H ≠ Hr because f1 ≠ f2. Using
the assumption that ϕ˜r C has worst reward r , we find that then Hr ∈ ϕ˜r R({Hr , H}). As a
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consequence, by Equation (7), we find that 0 =ϕr Hr ∈R({0,ϕr H}) =R({0, 1λ( f2− f1)}).
Using Axiom C4a we infer that 0 ∈ R({0, f2 − f1}), and using Axiom C4b that indeed
f1 ∈R({ f1, f2}).
For the direct implication of (iii), assume that C satisfies Axiom C3a. Consider any
A∗, A∗1 and A∗2 in Q(H(X ,R)) and assume that A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜r R(A∗2 ) and A∗2 ⊆ A∗. Then
ϕr A
∗
1 ⊆ R(ϕr A∗2 ) by Equation (7), and ϕr A∗1 ⊆ ϕr A∗. Use version (4) of Axiom C3a to
infer that then ϕr A
∗
1 ⊆R(ϕr A∗), whence indeed A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜r R(A∗) by Equation (7).
For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜r C satisfies Axiom C
∗
3 a. Consider any A , A1
and A2 inQ(L(X ×Rr )) and assume that A1 ⊆R(A2) and A2 ⊆ A . Use Lemma 7 to find
λ in R>0 and g inL(X ×Rr ) such that 1λ(A+{g}) =ϕr A∗ for some A∗ inQ(H(X ,R)).
Analogously, we find that 1
λ
(A2+{g}) =ϕr (A∗2 ) for some A∗2 ⊆ A∗. A1 ⊆ R(A2) implies
A1 ⊆ A2, so also 1λ(A1+{g}) =ϕr (A∗1 ) for some A∗1 ⊆ A∗2 . Using Axioms C4a and C4b, we
infer from the assumptions that 1
λ
(A1+{g}) ⊆R( 1λ(A2+{g})), or in other words,ϕr A∗1 ⊆
R(ϕr A∗2 ). Equation (7) then yields that A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜r R(A∗2 ). As a result, using Axiom C∗3 a,
A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜r R(A∗), which, again applying Equation (7), results in 1λ(A1 + {g}) = ϕr A∗1 ⊆
R(ϕr A∗) = R( 1λ(A + {g})), and as a consequence, by Axioms C4a and C4b, we find
eventually that indeed A1 ⊆R(A).
For the direct implication of (iv), assume that C satisfies Axiom C3b. Consider any
A∗, A∗1 and A∗2 in Q(H(X ,R)) and assume that A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜r R(A∗2 ) and A∗ ⊆ A∗1 . Then
ϕr A
∗
1 ⊆ R(ϕr A∗2 ) by Equation (7), and ϕr A∗ ⊆ ϕr A∗1 . Use version (5) of Axiom C3b to
infer that thenϕr (A∗1 ∖A∗) = (ϕr A∗1 )∖(ϕr A) ⊆R((ϕr A∗2 )∖(ϕr A∗)) =R(ϕr (A∗2 ∖A∗)),
whence indeed A∗1 ∖ A∗ ⊆ ϕ˜r R(A∗2 ∖ A∗).
For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜r C satisfies Axiom C
∗
3 b. Consider any
A , A1 and A2 inQ(L(X ×Rr )) and assume that A1 ⊆R(A2) and A ⊆ A1. Use Lemma 7
to find λ in R>0 and g in L(X ×Rr ) such that 1λ(A2 + {g}) = ϕr A∗2 for some A∗2 inQ(H(X ,R)). A1 ⊆ R(A2) implies A1 ⊆ A2, whence 1λ(A1 + {g}) = ϕr (A∗1 ) for some
A∗1 ⊆ A∗2 , and analogously, 1λ(A +{g}) = ϕr (A∗) for some A∗ ⊆ A∗1 . Using Axioms C4a
and C4b we find that
1
λ
(A1+{g}) ⊆R( 1λ(A2+{g})), or in other words,ϕr A∗1 ⊆R(ϕr A∗2 ).
Equation (7) then tells us that A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜r R(A∗2 ), which, using Axiom C∗3 b, results in A∗1∖A∗ ⊆
ϕ˜r R(A∗2 ∖ A∗). Again applying Equation (7) results in
1
λ
((A1∖ A)+{g}) = 1
λ
(A1+{g})∖ 1
λ
(A +{g}) = (ϕr A∗1 )∖(ϕr A∗) =ϕr (A∗1 ∖ A∗)⊆R(ϕr (A∗2 ∖ A∗)) =R((ϕr A∗2 )∖(ϕr A∗))=R( 1
λ
(A2+{g})∖ 1
λ
(A +{g})) =R( 1
λ
((A2∖ A)+{g})),
and as a consequence, by Axioms C4a and C4b, we find eventually that indeed A1∖ A ⊆
R(A2∖ A).
For (v), since by Proposition 8, ϕ˜r is a bijection between the choice functions onL(X ×Rr ) that satisfy Axioms C4a and C4b, and the choice functions onH(X ,R) that
satisfy Axiom C∗4 , therefore indeed ϕ˜r C satisfies Axiom C∗4 .
For the direct implication of (vi), assume that C satisfies Axiom C5. Consider any
A∗ and A∗1 in Q(H(X ,R)) and assume that A∗ ⊆ A∗1 ⊆ CH(A∗). Then ϕr A∗ ⊆ ϕr A∗1 ⊆
CH(ϕr A∗), whence C(ϕr A∗) ⊆ C(ϕr A∗1 ) by Axiom C5. Use Equation (7) to infer that
then indeed ϕ˜r C(A∗) ⊆ ϕ˜r C(A∗1 ).
For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜r C satisfies Axiom C
∗
5 . Consider any A
and A1 inQ(L(X ×Rr )) and assume that A ⊆ A1 ⊆ CH(A). Use Lemma 7 to find λ in
R>0 and g in L(X ×Rr ) such that 1λ(A1 + {g}) = ϕr A∗1 for some A∗1 in Q(H(X ,R)),
and analogously, 1
λ
(A +{g}) =ϕr (A∗) for some A∗ ⊆ A∗1 . From A1 ⊆ CH(A) infer that
1
λ
(A1 +{g}) ⊆ CH( 1λ(A +{g})), or in other words, ϕr A∗1 ⊆ CH(ϕr A∗). Then we claim
that A∗1 ⊆CH(A∗). To prove this, consider any H in A∗1 . Then there are n in N, Hi in A ,
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and αi ≥ 0 such that∑ni=1αi = 1 and H(⋅, s) =∑ni=1αi Hi (⋅, s) for all s inRr . Moreover,
H(⋅,r) = 1− ∑
s∈Rr H(⋅, s) = 1− ∑s∈Rr
n∑
i=1αi Hi (⋅, s)
= n∑
i=1αi −
n∑
i=1αi ∑s∈Rr Hi (⋅, s) =
n∑
i=1αi(1− ∑s∈Rr Hi (⋅, s)) =
n∑
i=1αi Hi (⋅,r),
so indeed H ∈ CH(A∗). Use Axiom C∗5 to infer that then ϕ˜r C(A∗) ⊆ ϕ˜r C(A∗1 ). Equa-
tion (7) turns this into C( 1
λ
(A +{g})) =C(ϕr A∗) ⊆C(ϕr A∗1 ) =C( 1λ(A1+{g})), which
by Axioms C4a and C4b, results in C(A) ⊆C(A1). 
We conclude that our discussion of choice functions on linear spaces subsumes the
treatment of choice functions on horse lotteries satisfying Axiom C∗4 . Using the connec-
tions established above, all the results that we will prove later on are also applicable to
choice functions on horse lotteries that satisfy the corresponding rationality axioms.
4. THE LINK WITH DESIRABILITY
Van Camp et al. (2017) have studied in some detail how the coherent choice functions
in the sense of Definition 2 can be related to coherent sets of desirable options (gambles).
As an example, given a coherent set of desirable options D , the choice function that
identifies the undominated—under the preference relation induced by D —options, is
coherent. This choice rule is called maximality (see Equation (12) further on). There
are other rules that induce coherent choice functions, such as E-admissibility—those
choice functions identify the options whose (precise) expectation is maximal for at least
one probability mass function in the credal set induced by D . Since we have shown
in earlier work (Van Camp et al., 2017, Proposition 13) that maximality leads to the
most conservative coherent choice function that reflects the binary choices represented
by D (see also Bradley, 2015, Theorem 3), we focus on maximality as the connecting
tool between desirability and choice functions. Here, we investigate what remains of
this connection when we require in addition that our choice functions should satisfy
Axiom C5.
We recall that a set of desirable options is simply a subset of the vector space V . The
underlying idea is that a subject strictly prefers each option in this set to the status quo 0.
As for choice functions, we pay special attention to coherent sets of desirable options.
Definition 8. A set of desirable options D is called coherent if for all u and v in V , and all
λ in R>0:
D1. 0 ∉D ;
D2. V≻0 ⊆D ;
D3. if u ∈D then λu ∈D ;
D4. if u, v ∈D then u+ v ∈D .
We collect all coherent sets of desirable options in the set D¯.
More details can be found in a number of papers and books (Walley, 1991, 2000; Moral,
2005; Miranda and Zaffalon, 2010; Couso and Moral, 2011; De Cooman and Quaeghebeur,
2012; De Cooman and Miranda, 2012; Quaeghebeur, 2014; Quaeghebeur et al., 2015;
De Bock and De Cooman, 2015).
Axioms D3 and D4 guarantee that a coherent D is a convex cone. This convex cone
induces a strict partial order ½D on V , by letting
u ½D v⇔ 0½D v −u⇔ v −u ∈D , (10)
so D = {u ∈V ∶ 0½D u} (De Cooman and Quaeghebeur, 2012; Quaeghebeur, 2014). D and½D are mathematically equivalent: given one of D or ½D , we can determine the other
unequivocally using the formulas above. When it is clear from the context which set of
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desirable options D we are working with, we often refrain from mentioning the explicit
reference to D in ½D and then we simply write ½. Coherence for sets of desirable options
transfers to binary relations ½ as follows: ½ must be a strict partial order—meaning that
it is irreflexive and transitive—such that ≺ ⊆ ½, and must satisfy the two characteristic
properties of Equations (2) and (3).
What is the relationship between choice functions and sets of desirable options? Since
we have just seen that sets of desirable options represent binary preferences, we see that
we can associate a set of desirable options DC with every given choice function C by
focusing on its binary choices:
u ½DC v⇔ v −u ∈DC ⇔ u ∈R({u, v}) for all u, v in V . (11)
DC is a coherent set of desirable options if C is a coherent choice function (Van Camp
et al., 2017, Proposition 12). Conversely (Van Camp et al., 2017, Proposition 13), if we
start out with a coherent set of desirable options D then the set {C ∈ C¯ ∶DC = D} of all
coherent choice functions whose binary choices are represented by D , is non-empty, and
its smallest, or least informative, element CD ∶= inf{C ∈ C¯ ∶DC =D} is given by:
CD (A) ∶= {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)v −u ∉D} = {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)u /½D v} for all A inQ. (12)
It selects all options from A that are undominated, or maximal, under the ordering ½D , or
in other words, it is the corresponding choice function based on Walley–Sen maximality.
This CD is easy to characterise:
Proposition 11. Given any coherent set of desirable options D , then
0 ∈CD ({0}∪ A)⇔D ∩ A =∅ for all A inQ.
Proof. By Equation (12), 0 ∈CD ({0}∪ A)⇔ (∀v ∈ {0}∪ A)v ∉ D ⇔ ({0}∪ A)∩D = ∅,
which is equivalent to A ∩D =∅, because 0 ∉D for any coherent D . 
Although CD is coherent when D is, it does not necessarily satisfy the additional Axiom C5,
as the following counterexample shows.
Example 1. Consider the two-dimensional vector space V =R2. We provide it with the
component-wise vector ordering ⪯, and consider the vacuous set of desirable options D ={u ∈V ∶ u ≻ 0} =V≻0, which is coherent. By Proposition 11, 0 ∈CD ({0}∪A)⇔ A∩V≻0 =∅
for all A inQ. To show that CD does not satisfy Axiom C5, consider A = {0,u, v}, where
u ∶= (−1,2) and v ∶= (2,−1). We find that 0 ∈CD (A) because {u, v}∩V≻0 =∅, since u ⊁ 0
and v ⊁ 0.
However, for the option set A1 = A ∪{u+v2 } ⊆CH(A), we find that u+v2 = (1/2, 1/2) ≻ 0
and therefore 0 ∉CD (A1), meaning that Axiom C5 is not satisfied. ◊
For the specific coherent set of desirable options D considered in Example 1, the corre-
sponding choice function CD fails to satisfy C5. However, there are other sets of desirable
options D for which CD does satisfy the convexity axiom. They are identified in the next
proposition.
Proposition 12. Consider any coherent set of desirable options D . Then the corresponding
coherent choice function CD satisfies Axiom C5 if and only if D
c is a convex cone, or in
other words, if and only if posi(Dc) =Dc , or equivalently, posi(Dc)∩D =∅.
Proof. Van Camp et al. (2017, Proposition 13) have already shown that CD is a coherent
choice function.
For necessity, assume that posi(Dc) ≠Dc , or equivalently, that posi(Dc)∩D ≠∅. Then
there is some option u in D such that u ∈ posi(Dc), meaning that there are n inN, λk in
R>0 and uk in Dc such that u =∑nk=1λk uk . Let A ∶= {0,u1, . . . ,un} and A1 ∶= A ∪{u}. Due
to the coherence of D [more precisely Axiom D3], we can rescale u ∈ D while keeping
the uk fixed, in such a way that we achieve that ∑nk=1λk = 1, whence A ⊆ A1 ⊆ CH(A).
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We find that 0 ∈CD (A) by Proposition 11, because A ∩D =∅, but 0 ∉CD (A1) because
u ∈ D , so A1 ∩D ≠ ∅. This tells us that CD does not satisfy Axiom C5, because clearly
CD (A) ⊈CD (A1).
For sufficiency, assume that CD does not satisfy Axiom C5. Therefore, there are A and
A1 inQ such that A ⊆ A1 ⊆ CH(A) and CD (A) ⊈CD (A1), or, in other words, such that
u ∈CD (A) and u ∉CD (A1) for some u in A . Consider such A and A1 inQ, and u in A .
Due to Axiom C4b, we find that 0 ∈CD (A −{u}) and 0 ∉CD (A1−{u}), or equivalently,
by Proposition 11, that A −{u} ⊆Dc and A1−{u}∩D ≠∅. But A1−{u} ⊆CH(A)−{u} =
CH(A −{u}) ⊆ posi(A −{u}) ⊆ posi(Dc), so posi(Dc)∩D ≠∅. 
This proposition seems to indicate that there is something special about coherent sets of
desirable options whose complement is a convex cone too. We give them a special name
that will be motivated and explained in the next section.
Definition 9. A coherent set of desirable options D is called lexicographic if
posi(Dc) =Dc , or, equivalently, if posi(Dc)∩D =∅.
We collect all the lexicographic coherent sets of desirable options in D¯L.
Another important subclass Dˆ of coherent sets of desirable options collects all the
maximally informative, or maximal, ones:
Dˆ ∶= {D ∈ D¯ ∶ (∀D′ ∈ D¯)D ⊆D′⇒D =D′}.
The sets of desirable options in Dˆ are the undominated elements of the complete
infimum-semilattice (D¯,⊆). Couso and Moral (2011) have proved the following elegant
and useful characterisation of these maximal elements:
Proposition 13. Given any coherent set of desirable options D and any non-zero option
u ∉ D , then posi(D ∪ {−u}) is a coherent set of desirable options. As a consequence, a
coherent set of desirable options D is maximal if and only if
(∀u ∈V ∖{0})(u ∈D or −u ∈D).
De Cooman and Quaeghebeur (2012) have proved that the set of all coherent sets of
desirable options is dually atomic, meaning that any coherent set of desirable options D
is the infimum of its non-empty set of dominating maximal coherent sets of desirable
options:
Proposition 14. For any coherent set of desirable options D , its set of dominating maximal
coherent sets of desirable options DˆD ∶= {Dˆ ∈ Dˆ ∶D ⊆ Dˆ} is non-empty, and D =⋂DˆD .
Any maximal coherent set of desirable options is also a lexicographic one: Dˆ ⊆ D¯L 3
Consider a maximal D and arbitrary n inN, uk in D
c and λk ∈R>0 for k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Then
since all −uk ∈D ∪{0} by Proposition 13, we infer that −∑nk=1λk uk ∈D ∪{0}, because
the coherent D is in particular a convex cone. If∑nk=1λk uk = 0, then∑nk=1λk uk ∈Dc by
Axiom D1. If∑nk=1λk uk ≠ 0, then−∑nk=1λk uk ∈D , and since coherence [more specifically,
a combination of Axioms D1 and D4] implies that a coherent set of gambles cannot
include both a gamble and its opposite, we conclude that, here too, ∑nk=1λk uk ∈ Dc .
Therefore, Dc is indeed a convex cone.
3As pointed out by a reviewer, this can actually be obtained as a corollary to a result by Hammer (1955,
Theorem 2), by taking into account that maximal sets of desirable gambles are semispaces and that lexicographic
sets of desirable gambles correspond to hemispaces. To make this paper more self-contained, we give a proof
using the coherence axioms of sets of desirable gambles we are employing in this paper.
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5. LEXICOGRAPHIC CHOICE FUNCTIONS
In this section, we embark on a more detailed study of lexicographic sets of desirable
options, and amongst other things, explain where their name comes from. We will restrict
ourselves here to the special case where V is the linear space L(X ) of all gambles on
a finite possibility space X , provided with the component-wise order ≤ as its vector
ordering.
We first show that the lower expectation functional associated with a lexicographic D
is actually a linear prevision (Walley, 1991; Troffaes and De Cooman, 2014).
Proposition 15. For any D in D¯L, the coherent lower prevision P D on L(X ) defined by
P D ( f ) ∶= sup{µ ∈R ∶ f −µ ∈D} for all f in L(X )
is a linear prevision: a real linear functional that is positive—so (∀ f ≥ 0)P D ( f ) ≥ 0—and
normalised—meaning that P D (1) = 1.
Proof. Consider any f inL and ² inR>0, then we first prove that f ∈D or ²− f ∈D . Assume
ex absurdo that f ∉ D and ²− f ∉ D . Then, because by assumption posi(Dc) = Dc is a
convex cone, we also have that f +²− f = ² ∉D , which contradicts Axiom D2. Now, Walley
(1991, Theorem 3.8.3) guarantees that for any such D , the corresponding functional P D
is indeed a linear prevision. 
To get some feeling for what these lexicographic models represent, we first look at
the special case of binary possibility spaces {a,b}, leading to a two-dimensional option
space V =L({a,b}) provided with the point-wise order. It turns out that lexicographic
sets of desirable options (gambles) are easy to characterise there, so we have a simple
expression for D¯L.
Proposition 16. All lexicographic coherent sets of desirable gambles on the binary possi-
bility space {a,b} are given by (see also Figure 1):D¯L ∶= {Dρ ,Daρ ,Dbρ ∶ ρ ∈ (0,1)}∪{D0,D1} = {Dρ ∶ ρ ∈ (0,1)}∪ Dˆ,
where
Dρ ∶= {λ(ρ− I{a}) ∶λ ∈R}+V≻0 = span({ρ− I{a}})+V≻0 for all ρ in (0,1)
Daρ ∶=Dρ ∪{λ(ρ− I{a}) ∶λ ∈R<0} =Dρ ∪posi({I{a}−ρ}) for all ρ in (0,1)
Dbρ ∶=Dρ ∪{λ(ρ− I{a}) ∶λ ∈R>0} =Dρ ∪posi({ρ− I{a}}) for all ρ in (0,1).
D0 ∶= { f ∈V ∶ f (b) > 0}∪V≻0
D1 ∶= { f ∈V ∶ f (a) > 0}∪V≻0.
Proof. We first observe that every set of desirable options in D¯L is coherent. Indeed,
for any ρ in (0,1), Dρ is the smallest coherent set of desirable gambles corresponding
to the linear prevision Ep , with p ∶= (ρ,1−ρ), while Daρ , Dbρ are maximal coherent sets
of desirable gambles corresponding to the same linear prevision Ep . Finally, D0 is the
maximal (and only) coherent set of desirable gambles corresponding to Ep with p ∶= (0,1),
while D1 is the maximal (and only) coherent set of desirable gambles corresponding to
Ep with p ∶= (1,0).
We now prove that we recover all lexicographic coherent sets of desirable gambles in
this way. Consider any lexicographic coherent set of desirable gambles D∗. Then P D∗ is a
linear prevision, by Proposition 15, so P D∗ is characterised (i) by the mass function (1,0),
(ii) by the mass function (0,1), or (iii) by the mass function (ρ∗,1−ρ∗) for some ρ∗ in(0,1). If (i), the only coherent set of desirable gambles that induces the linear prevision
with mass function (1,0) is D1 ∈ D¯L. If (ii), the only coherent set of desirable gambles
that induces the linear prevision with mass function (0,1) is D0 ∈ D¯L. If (iii), there are
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only three coherent sets of desirable gambles that induce the linear prevision with mass
function (ρ∗,1−ρ∗): Dρ∗ , Daρ∗ and Dbρ∗ , and all are elements of D¯L. 
In the language of sets of desirable gambles (see for instance Quaeghebeur, 2014), this
means that in the binary case lexicographic sets of desirable gambles are either maximal
or strictly desirable with respect to a linear prevision.
a
b
(ρ−1,ρ) Dρ
a
b
(ρ−1,ρ) Daρ
a
b
(ρ−1,ρ) Dbρ
a
b
I{b} D0
a
b
I{a}
D1
FIGURE 1. The lexicographic coherent sets of desirable gambles on the
binary possibility space {a,b}, with ρ ∈ (0,1).
We now turn to the more general finite-dimensional case. Recall that a lexicographic
order <L with ` ∈N layers on a vector space V of finite dimension n is defined by
u <L v⇔ (∃k ∈ {1, . . . ,`})(uk < vk and (∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,k −1})u j = v j ),
and denote, as usual, its reflexive version ≤L as u ≤L v ⇔ (u <L v or u = v) for any two
vectors u = (u1, . . . ,un) and v = (v1, . . . , vn) in V . A lexicographic probability system is
an `-tuple p ∶= (p1, . . . , p`) of probability mass functions on a possibility space X of
cardinality n. We associate with this tuple p an expectation operator Ep ∶= (Ep1 , . . . ,Ep`),
and a (strict) preference relation ≺p onL(X ), defined by:
f ≺p g ⇔ Ep ( f ) <L Ep (g), for all f , g inL(X ). (13)
We refer to work by Blume et al. (1991), Fishburn (1982) and Seidenfeld et al. (1990)
for more details on generic lexicographic probability systems. The connection between
lexicographic probability systems and sets of desirable gambles has also been studied
by Cozman (2015) and Benavoli et al. (2017), and the connection with full conditional
measures by Halpern (2010) and Hammond (1994). Below, we first recall a number of rel-
evant basic properties of lexicographic orders in Propositions 18 and 19. We then provide
a characterisation of lexicographic sets of desirable gambles in terms of lexicographic
orders in Theorem 23.
Remark that the reflexive version ⪯p of ≺p —defined by f ⪯p g ⇔ Ep ( f ) ≤L Ep (g) for
all f and g inL(X )—is a total order onL(X ) (Blume et al., 1991).
In what follows, we will restrict our attention to lexicographic probability systems p
that satisfy the following condition:(∀x ∈X )(∃k ∈ {1, . . . ,`})pk(x) > 0. (14)
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This condition requires that there should be no possible outcome in X that has zero
probability in every layer. It is closely related to the notion of a Savage-null event (Savage,
1972, Section 2.7):
Definition 10. An event B ⊆ X is called Savage-null if (∀ f , g ∈ L(X ))IB f ⪯p IB g . The
event ∅ is always Savage-null, and is called the trivial Savage-null event.
An important feature of preference relations ≺p based on lexicographic probability
systems is the incomparability relation ∥p , defined by: f ∥p g if and only if f /≺p g and
g /≺p f for all f and g inL(X ). Since ⪯p is a total order, it follows that
f ∥p g ⇔ Ep ( f ) = Ep (g). (15)
Finally, it also follows that
f /≺p g ⇔ g ≺p f or g ∥p f ⇔ Ep (g) ≤L Ep ( f ). (16)
Proposition 17. Consider any lexicographic probability system p = (p1, . . . , p`). Then
Condition (14) holds if and only if there are no non-trivial Savage-null events.
Proof. For the direct implication, consider any lexicographic probability system p that
satisfies Condition (14), and consider any non-empty event B ⊆X . Consider any x in B ,
then IB ≥ I{x} so Epk (IB) ≥ Epk (I{x}) for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,`}. Also, Ep (0) <L Ep (I{x}) by
Condition (14), so 0IB ≺p 1IB whence 1IB /⪯p 0IB and hence, by Definition 10, B is indeed
no Savage-null event.
For the converse implication, consider any lexicographic probability system p and
assume that Condition (14) does not hold. Then there is some x∗ inX such that pk(x∗) =
0 for all k in {1, . . . ,`}, and therefore Epk ( f I{x∗}) = 0 = Epk (g I{x∗}) for all f and g inL(X )
and k in {1, . . . ,`}, so Ep ( f I{x∗}) = Ep (g I{x∗}) for all f and g inL(X ). This implies that
f I{x∗} ⪯p g I{x∗} for all f and g in L(X ), so indeed there is a non-trivial Savage-null
event {x∗}. 
Proposition 18. Consider any lexicographic probability system p with ` layers. Then ≺p
is a strict weak order, meaning that ≺p is irreflexive, and both ≺p and ∥p are transitive. As
a consequence, the relation /≺p is transitive as well.
Proof. This is a consequence of Equations (13), (15) and (16), taking into account that <L
and ≤L are transitive, and that <L is irreflexive. 
We now link the lexicographic orderings ≺p with the preference relation ½D based on
desirability, given by Equation (10). We begin with an auxiliary result:4
Proposition 19. Consider any lexicographic probability system p with ` layers, and con-
sider any coherent set of desirable gambles D . Then ≺p and ½D are (strict) vector orders
compatible with ≺: they are irreflexive, transitive and
(i) f ≺p g ⇔ f +h ≺p g +h⇔λ f ≺p λg ;
(ii) if there are no non-trivial Savage-null events, then f < g ⇒ f ≺p g ;
(iii) f ½D g ⇔ f +h ½D g +h⇔λ f ½D λg ;
(iv) f < g ⇒ f ½D g ,
for all f , g and h in L(X ) and λ in R>0.
Proof. It is clear from Proposition 18 that ≺p is irreflexive and transitive. To show that ½D
is irreflexive, infer from f − f = 0 ∉D [Axiom D1] that indeed f /½D f for all f in L(X ). To
show that ½D is transitive, assume that f ½D g and g ½D h. Then g − f ∈D and h− g ∈D ,
by Equation (10), and hence h− f = g − f +(h−g) ∈D , by Axiom D4. Using Equation (10)
again, we find that then indeed f ½D h. Let us now prove the remaining statements.
4Except for the second statement, most of the items in this propositions are well-known (Quaeghebeur,
2014, Section 1.4.1); we include a simple proof for completeness.
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(i) This follows from the definition of ≺ and the linearity of the expectation operator.
(ii) Assume that there are no non-trivial Savage-null events. Use Proposition 17 to
infer that Condition (14) holds. Consider any f in L(X ) such that 0 < f . Then
0 ≤ f —so 0 ≤ Epk ( f ) for every k in {1, . . . ,`}—and 0 < f (x∗) for some x∗ in X .
Then pk(x∗) > 0 for some k in {1, . . . ,`} by Condition (14), so 0 <L Ep (I{x∗}). Use
f (x∗)I{x∗} ≤ f to infer that then also 0 <L Ep ( f ), whence indeed 0 ≺p f .
(iii) The first equivalence follows immediately from Equation (10), while the second is
a consequence of the scaling axiom of coherent sets of desirable options.
(iv) Assume that f < g . Then 0 < g − f , whence g − f ∈ D by Axiom D2. Using Equa-
tion (10), we find that then indeed f ½D g . 
Next we establish a link between lexicographic probability systems and preference
relations associated with lexicographic sets of desirable gambles. We refer to papers by
Cozman (2015, Section 2.1) and Seidenfeld et al. (1990) for other relevant discussion
on the connection between lexicographic probabilities and partial preference relations.
Our proof is somewhat reminiscent of the representation of conditional probabilities by
Krauss (1968), and will make repeated use of the following separation theorem (Holmes,
1975), in the form stated by Walley (1991, Appendix E1):
Theorem 20 (Separating hyperplane theorem). Let W1 and W2 be two convex subsets
of a finite-dimensional linear topological space B. If 0 ∈W1∩W2 and int(W1)∩W2 =∅,
then there is a non-zero continuous linear functionalΛ on B such that
Λ(w) ≥ 0 for all w inW1 and Λ(w ′) ≤ 0 for all w ′ inW2.
If W1 and W2 are finite, W1 non-empty, and ∑mi=1λi wi −∑nk=1µk w ′k ≠ 0 for all m and
n in N, all λ1, . . . , λm in R≥0 with λi > 0 for at least one i in {1, . . . ,m}, all µ1, . . . , µn in
R≥0, all w1, . . . , wm inW1, and all w ′1, . . . , w ′n inW2, then there is a non-zero continuous
linear functionalΛ on B such that
Λ(w) > 0 for all w inW1 and Λ(w ′) ≤ 0 for all w ′ inW2.
Two clarifications here are (i) that we will apply the theorem to linear subsets of L(X ),
which is a linear topological space (Walley, 1991, Appendix D) that is finite-dimensional
becauseX is finite, and (ii) that when the linear topological space is finite-dimensional,
the assumption int(W1) ≠∅ that Walley (1991, Appendix E1) mentions is not necessary
for the separating hyperplane theorem to hold, as shown by Holmes (1975, Theorem 4B).
Our proof will also make use of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 21. Consider any coherent set D of desirable gambles on a finite possibility spaceX , and consider any linear subspaceΛ ⊆L(X ). Then int(cl(D ∩Λ))∩Dc =∅, where int
is the topological interior and cl the topological closure.
Proof. We first prove int(cl(D))∩Dc =∅. To show that, we will use the fact that D , and
therefore also cl(D), is a convex set. Since the interior of a convex set is always included
in the relative interior ri of that convex set (see Brøndsted, 1983, Section 1.3), we find that
int(cl(D)) ⊆ ri(cl(D)). A well-known result (Brøndsted, 1983, Theorem 3.4(d)) states
that ri(cl(C)) = ri(C) for any convex set C in a finite-dimensional vector space, whence
int(cl(D)) ⊆ ri(D). But ri(D) is a subset of D , so int(cl(D)) ⊆ D , and hence indeed
int(cl(D))∩Dc =∅.
Now consider D ∩Λ, a subset of D . Since both cl and int respect set inclusion, we find
that int(cl(D ∩Λ)) ⊆ int(cl(D)) ⊆D , whence indeed int(cl(D ∩Λ))∩Dc =∅. 
Lemma 22. Consider a non-zero real linear functional Λ1 on the n-dimensional real
vector space L(X ), and a sequence of non-zero real linear functionalsΛk defined on the
n−k +1-dimensional real vector space kerΛk−1 for all k in {2, . . . ,`}, where ` ∈ {2, . . . ,n}.
Assume that allΛk are positive in the sense that (∀ f ∈L≥0∩domΛk)(Λk( f ) ≥ 0), for all
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k ∈ {1, . . . ,`}. Then for each k in {2, . . . ,`} the real linear functionalΛk on kerΛk−1 can be
extended to a real linear functional Γk on L(X ) with the following properties:
(i) For all f in L≥0: Γk( f ) ≥ 0;
(ii) Γk(1) > 0;
(iii) kerΓk ∩kerΛk−1 = kerΛk ;
(iv) For all f in kerΛk−1: Γk( f ) > 0⇔Λk( f ) > 0.
Proof. Fix any k in {2, . . . ,`}. Since the real functionalΛk on the n−k +1-dimensional
real vector space kerΛk−1 is non-zero, there is some hk in kerΛk−1 such thatΛk(hk) > 0.
We will consider the quotient spaceL(X )/kerΛk , a k-dimensional vector space whose
elements f /kerΛk = f +kerΛk are the affine subspaces through f , parallel to the sub-
space kerΛk , for f ∈L(X ). We first show that it follows from Theorem 20 that there is a
non-zero linear functional Γ˜k onL(X )/kerΛk such that
Γ˜k(u) ≤ 0 for all u inW2k ∶= {−I{x}/kerΛk ∶ x ∈Xk}, and
Γ˜k(u) > 0 for all u inW1k ∶= {hk/kerΛk}∪{I{x}/kerΛk ∶ x ∈Xk}, (17)
where we let Xk ∶= {x ∈ X ∶ I{x} ∉ kerΛk} ⊆ X . The set Xk is non-empty: since kerΛk
is n −k-dimensional, at most n −k of the linearly independent indicators I{x}, x ∈ X
may lie in kerΛk , so ∣Xk ∣ ≥ k. To show that we can apply Theorem 20, we prove that
the condition for it is satisfied: ∑ni=1λi w1i −∑mk=1µk w2k ≠ 0 for all m and n in N, all λ1,
. . . , λm in R≥0 with λi > 0 for at least one i in {1, . . . ,m}, all µ1, . . . , µn in R≥0, all w11 ,
. . . , w1n inW1k , and all w21 , . . . , w2m inW2k . SinceW1k andW2k are finite, it is not difficult
to see that it suffices to consider ∑ni=1λi w1i = λhk/kerΛk +∑x∈Xk λx I{x}/kerΛk and∑mj=1µ j w2j =−∑x∈Xk µx I{x}/kerΛk . So assume ex absurdo thatλhk/kerΛk+∑x∈Xk (λx+
µx)I{x}/kerΛk = 0, or equivalently, that λhk +∑x∈Xk (λx +µx)I{x} ∈ kerΛk for some
µx ≥ 0, λx ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0 for all x in Xk , where λ or at least one of {λx ∶ x ∈ Xk} are
positive. LetX ′k ∶= {x ∈Xk ∶λx +µx > 0} and g ∶=∑x∈X ′k (λx +µx)I{x}, then we know that
λhk + g ∈ kerΛk .
There are now a number of possibilities. The first is that λ = 0, whence X ′k ≠∅ and
therefore g ∈ kerΛk ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆ kerΛ1. This implies that 0 =Λ1(g) =∑x∈X ′
k
(λx +µx)Λ1(I{x}).
Since all I{x} ≻ 0 andΛ1 is positive, we find that I{x} ∈ kerΛ1 = domΛ2 for all x inX ′k . This
in turn allows us to conclude that 0 =Λ2(g) =∑x∈X ′
k
(λx +µx)Λ2(I{x}). Since all I{x} ≻ 0
and Λ2 is positive, we find that I{x} ∈ kerΛ2 = domΛ3 for all x in X ′k . We can go on in
this way until we eventually conclude that 0 =Λk(g) =∑x∈X ′
k
(λx +µx)Λk(I{x}). Since
all I{x} ≻ 0 andΛk is positive, we find that I{x} ∈ kerΛk for all x inX ′k , a contradiction.
The second possibility is that λ > 0. If nowX ′k =∅, we find that λhk ∈ kerΛk , whence
λΛk(hk) = 0, a contradiction. IfX ′k ≠∅, we find that λhk + g ∈ kerΛk ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆ kerΛ1. Since
hk ∈ kerΛk−1 ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆ kerΛ1, this implies that g ∈ kerΛk−1 ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆ kerΛ1 too. This implies
that 0 = Λ1(g) =∑x∈X ′
k
(λx +µx)Λ1(I{x}). Since all I{x} ≻ 0 and Λ1 is positive, we find
that I{x} ∈ kerΛ1 = domΛ2 for all x in X ′k . This in turn allows us to conclude that 0 =
Λ2(g) =∑x∈X ′
k
(λx +µx)Λ2(I{x}). Since all I{x} ≻ 0 andΛ2 is positive, we find that I{x} ∈
kerΛ2 = domΛ3 for all x inX ′k . We can go on in this way until we eventually conclude that
0 =Λk−1(g) =∑x∈X ′
k
(λx +µx)Λk−1(I{x}). Since all I{x} ≻ 0 andΛk−1 is positive, we find
that I{x} ∈ kerΛk−1 = domΛk for all x inX ′k . This now allows us to rewrite λhk+g ∈ kerΛk
as 0 = Λk(λhk + g) = λΛk(hk)+∑x∈X ′
k
(λx +µx)Λk(I{x}). Since all I{x} ≻ 0 and Λk is
positive, this implies that λΛk(hk) ≤ 0, a contradiction. We conclude that, indeed, there
is a non-zero linear functional Γ˜k onL(X )/kerΛk that satisfies Equation (17).
We now define the new real linear functional Γk onL(X ) by letting
Γk( f ) ∶= Γ˜k( f /kerΛk) for all f inL(X ).
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Observe that, since f =∑x∈X f (x)I{x}, this leads to
Γk( f ) = ∑
x∈X f (x)Γ˜k(I{x}/kerΛk) = ∑x∈Xk f (x)Γ˜k(I{x}/kerΛk),
where the second equality follows from I{x} ∈ kerΛk , and therefore I{x}/kerΛk = 0, for
all x ∈X ∖Xk . If we also take into account Equation (17), this proves in particular that (i)
and (ii) hold.
For the rest of the proof, consider any f in kerΛk−1 and λ ∶=Λk( f )/Λk(hk), a well-
defined real number becauseΛk(hk) > 0. Then 0 =Λk( f )−λΛk(hk) =Λk( f −λhk), so f −
λhk ∈ kerΛk . As a result, f /kerΛk = λhk/kerΛk and therefore Γk( f ) = Γ˜k( f /kerΛk) =
Γ˜k(λhk/kerΛk) =λΓ˜k(hk/kerΛk). Substituting back for λ, we get the equality:
Γk( f )Λk(hk) = Γ˜k(hk/kerΛk)Λk( f ).
Since both Λk(hk) > 0 and Γ˜k(hk/kerΛk) > 0 [by Equation (17)], we see that Γk( f )
andΛk( f ) are either both zero, both (strictly) positive, or both (strictly) negative. This
proves (iii) and (iv). 
Theorem 23. Given a lexicographic probability system p = (p1, . . . , p`) that has no non-
trivial Savage-null events, the set of desirable gambles Dp ∶= { f ∈L(X ) ∶ 0 ≺p f } corre-
sponding with the preference relation ≺p , is an element of D¯L—a coherent and lexico-
graphic set of desirable gambles. Conversely, given a lexicographic set of desirable gambles
D in D¯L, its corresponding preference relation ½D is a preference relation based on some
lexicographic probability system p = (p1, . . . , p`) that has no non-trivial Savage-null
events.
Proof. We begin with the first statement. We first show that Dp is coherent. For Axiom D1,
infer from 0/≺p 0 by the irreflexivity of ≺p [see Proposition 18] that indeed 0 ∉ Dp . For
Axiom D2, consider any f in L>0. Use Proposition 19 to infer that 0 ≺p f , whence indeed
f ∈Dp . For Axiom D3, consider any f in Dp and λ inR>0. Then 0 ≺p f , and hence 0 ≺p λ f
using Proposition 19. Then indeed λ f ∈Dp . For Axiom D4, consider any f and g in Dp ,
whence 0 ≺p f and 0 ≺p g . From 0 ≺p g infer that f ≺p f + g by Proposition 19, and
using 0 ≺p f , that 0 ≺p f + g by the transitivity of ≺p [see Proposition 18]. Then indeed
f + g ∈Dp .
So it only remains to show that posi(Dcp ) =Dcp . Consider any f and g in Dcp and any
λ1 and λ2 in R>0, then we must prove that λ1 f +λ2g ∈ Dcp . Since by assumption 0/≺p f
and 0/≺p g , Equation (16) guarantees that
Ep ( f ) ≤L Ep (0) = 0 and Ep (g) ≤L Ep (0).
By the linearity of the expectation operator,
Ep (λ1 f +λ2g) ≤L Ep (0) = 0,
whence 0/≺pλ1 f +λ2g . Then indeed λ1 f +λ2g ∈Dcp .
For the second statement, we consider any D in D¯L, and we construct a lexicographic
probability system p with no non-trivial Savage-null events and such that ≺p equals ½D .
Define the real functional Λ1 on L(X ) by letting Λ1( f ) ∶= sup{α ∈ R ∶ f −α ∈ D} for all
f in L(X ). Proposition 15 guarantees that Λ1 is a linear functional. Its kernel kerΛ1 is
an n −1-dimensional linear space,5 where n is the finite dimension of the real vector
space L(X )—the cardinality ofX . Since both Dc and kerΛ1 are convex cones, so is their
intersection Dc ∩kerΛ1, and it contains 0 because 0 ∈ Dc and 0 ∈ kerΛ1. Using similar
arguments, we see that D ∩kerΛ1 is either a convex cone or empty. When D ∩kerΛ1 =∅,
5To see that kerΛ1 is a linear space, note that by Proposition 15Λ1 = P D is a linear prevision—soΛ1 is a
linear map from the n-dimensional linear spaceL(X ) to R. SinceΛ1 is a linear map, its kernel is closed under
addition and scalar multiplication, so it is a linear space, and by the rank-nullity theorem, its dimension is(dimL(X ))−dimR = n−1.
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let ` ∶= 1, and stop. When D ∩kerΛ1 ≠∅, it follows from Theorem 20 that there is some
non-zero (continuous) linear functionalΛ2 on kerΛ1 such that
Λ2( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in Dc ∩kerΛ1 andΛ2( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D ∩kerΛ1.
[Apply Theorem 20 withB = kerΛ1,W2 =Dc∩kerΛ1 andW1 = cl(D∩kerΛ1) (the topolog-
ical closure of D∩kerΛ1 in kerΛ1); then int(W1)∩W2 =∅ by Lemma 21, and 0 ∈W1∩W2]
kerΛ2 is a n−2-dimensional linear space. Also, D ∩kerΛ2 is either empty or a non-empty
convex cone. If it is empty, let ` ∶= 2; otherwise, we repeat the same procedure again: it
follows from Theorem 20 that there is some non-zero (continuous) linear functionalΛ3
on kerΛ2 such that
Λ3( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in Dc ∩kerΛ2 andΛ3( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D ∩kerΛ2.
[Apply Theorem 20 withB = kerΛ2,W2 =Dc∩kerΛ2 andW1 = cl(D∩kerΛ2) (the topolog-
ical closure of D∩kerΛ2 in kerΛ2); then int(W1)∩W2 =∅ by Lemma 21, and 0 ∈W1∩W2]
kerΛ3 is a n−3-dimensional linear space. Also, D ∩kerΛ3 is either empty or a non-empty
convex cone. If it is empty, let ` ∶= 3; if not, continue in the same vein. This leads to suc-
cessive linear functionalsΛk defined on the n−k +1-dimenional linear spaces kerΛk−1
such that
Λk( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in Dc ∩kerΛk−1 andΛk( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D ∩kerΛk−1. (18)
This sequence stops as soon as D ∩kerΛk =∅, and we then let ` ∶= k. Because the finite
dimensions of the successive kerΛk decrease with 1 at each step, we are guaranteed to
stop after at most n repetitions: should D ∩kerΛk ≠∅ for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n−1} then kerΛn
will be the 0-dimensional linear space {0}, and then necessarily D ∩kerΛn =∅. For the
last functionalΛ`, we have moreover that
Λ`( f ) > 0 for all f in D ∩kerΛ`−1. (19)
To see this, recall that by construction Λ`( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D ∩ kerΛ`−1, and that
D ∩kerΛ` =∅.
In this fashion we obtain ` linear functionalsΛ1, . . . ,Λ`, each defined on the kernel
of the previous functional—except for the domain L(X ) of Λ1. We now show that we
can turn theΛ2, . . . ,Λ` into expectation operators: positive and normalised linear func-
tionals on the linear space L(X ). Indeed, consider their respective extensions Γ2, . . . ,
Γ` to L(X ) from Lemma 22, and let Γ1 ∶=Λ1. They satisfy Γk(1) > 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,`};
see Proposition 15 and Lemma 22(ii). Now consider the real linear functionals onL(X )
defined by E1 ∶= Γ1, and Ek( f ) ∶= Γk( f )/Γk(1) for all k in {2, . . . ,`} and f in L(X ). It
is obvious from Proposition 15 and Lemma 22(i) that these linear functionals are nor-
malised and positive, and therefore expectation operators onL(X ). Indeed each Ek is the
expectation operator associated with the mass function pk defined by pk(x) ∶= Ek(I{x})
for all x inX . In this way, p ∶= (p1, . . . , p`) defines a lexicographic probability system.
We now prove that p has no non-trivial Savage-null events, using Proposition 17.
Assume ex absurdo that there is some x∗ in X such that pk(x∗) = Ek(I{x∗}) = 0 for all
k in {1, . . . ,`}. Then I{x∗} ∈ kerΓ1 = kerΛ1 and I{x∗} ∈ Γk for all k in {2, . . . ,`}. Invoke
Lemma 22(iii) to find that I{x∗} ∈ kerΛ1 ∩kerΓ2 = kerΛ2. Repeated application of this
same lemma eventually leads us to conclude that I{x∗} ∈ kerΛ`−1 and I{x∗} ∈ kerΛ`.
Since also I{x∗} ∈D and hence I{x∗} ∈D ∩kerΛ`−1 [Axiom D2], Equation (19) implies that
Λ`(I{x∗}) > 0, a contradiction.
It now only remains to prove that ½D is the lexicographic ordering with respect to this
lexicographic probability system, or in other words that
f ∈D ⇔ 0 <L (E1( f ), . . . ,E`( f )) for all f inL(X ).
For necessity, assume that f ∈D . Then E1( f ) ≥ 0 by the definition ofΛ1. If E1( f ) > 0,
then we are done. So assume that E1( f ) = 0. Then f ∈ kerΛ1 and Λ2( f ) ≥ 0 by Equa-
tion (18). Again, if Λ2( f ) > 0, we can invoke Lemma 22(iv) to find that Γ2( f ) > 0 and
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hence E2( f ) > 0, and we are done. So assume that Λ2( f ) = 0. Then f ∈ kerΛ2 and
Λ3( f ) ≥ 0 by Equation (18). We can go on in this way, and we call k the largest number
for which E j ( f ) = 0 for all j in {1, . . . ,k − 1}, or in other words, the smallest number
for which Ek( f ) > 0. Then k ≤ ` by construction—see Equation (19))—, whence indeed
0 <L (E1( f ), . . . ,E`( f )).
For sufficiency, assume that 0 <L (E1( f ), . . . ,E`( f )), meaning that there is some k
in {1, . . . ,`} for which E j ( f ) = 0 = Γ j ( f ) for all j in {1, . . . ,k −1} and Ek( f ) > 0, whence
also Γk( f ) > 0. So f ∈ kerΓ j for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,k −1} and therefore repeated application
of Lemma 22(iii) tells us that f ∈ kerΛ j for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,k −1}. Since Γk( f ) > 0, we infer
from Lemma 22(iv) that alsoΛk( f ) > 0, whence indeed f ∈D by Equation (18). 
We conclude that the sets of desirable options in D¯L are exactly the ones that are
representable by a lexicographic probability system that has no non-trivial Savage-null
events. This is, of course, the reason why we have called the coherent sets of desirable
options in D¯L ∶= {D ∈ D¯ ∶ posi(Dc) =Dc} lexicographic.
This does not mean, however, that the correspondence between the two families is
bijective:6 Indeed, consider the binary possibility spaceX = {a,b} and the lexicographic
systems p = (p1, p2) and p′ = (p1, p′2), associated with the respective mass functions
p1 = (1/2, 1/2), p2 = (0,1) and p′2 = (1/4, 3/4) on {a,b}. Then p and p′ have no non-trivial
Savage-null events. However, Dp = Dp′ = { f ∶ f (a)+ f (b) > 0 or f (b) = − f (a) > 0}, so
we see that there are two different lexicographic probability systems that map to the
same lexicographic set of desirable gambles. Note, however, that ≺p and ≺p′ are both
equal to ½D —and therefore ≺p=≺p′—, as is also guaranteed by the following corollary.
Corollary 24. Consider any coherent lexicographic set of desirable gambles D in D¯L and
any lexicographic probability system p that has no non-trivial Savage-null events. Then½D=≺p⇔ D = Dp . As a consequence, given any coherent lexicographic set of desirable
gambles D in D¯L, then ½D=≺p for all lexicographic probability systems p that have no
non-trivial Savage-null events such that Dp =D .
Proof. For the first statement, infer the following chain of equivalences:½D=≺p ⇔ (∀ f ∈L)(0½D f ⇔ 0 ≺p f ) by Proposition 19(i) and (iii)⇔ (∀ f ∈L)( f ∈D ⇔ f ∈Dp ) by the definitions of ½D and Dp⇔D =Dp
The second statement now follows immediately. 
This corollary is important, since it guarantees that ½p and ½p′ differ if and only if
Dp and Dp′ differ: it rules out that two different preference relations ½p and ½p′ (based
on two different lexicographic probability systems that have no non-trivial Savage-null
events) map to the same coherent lexicographic set of desirable gambles Dp =Dp′ . For
more information about this relation—and also taking updating into account—can be
found in work by Benavoli et al. (2017), which builds on the important lexicographic
separation theorem by Martínez-Legaz (1983).
Remark 1. As pointed out by a reviewer, the second part of Theorem 23 can also be
obtained as a consequence of an earlier result by Martínez-Legaz and Vicente-Pérez (2012,
Corollary 3.5), considering that lexicographic sets of desirable gambles are hemispaces
and the representation of lexicographic probability systems as stochastic matrices. This
same result was also used by Benavoli et al. (2017) in their study of the connection
between sets of desirable gambles and sets of lexicographic probability systems. It makes
6That two different lexicographic systems (represented as stochastic matrices of full rank) may be associated
with the same coherent set of desirable gambles can also be inferred from an example by Benavoli et al. (2017,
Example 1).
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use of a lexicographic separation result (Martínez-Legaz, 1983) that is more directly suited
for our purpose than the separation results (see Theorem 20) we borrowed from Walley
(1991) . However, we feel that there is value in our giving a more direct proof, since it is
more directly tailored to, and ‘translated’ in, the language of sets of desirable gambles. ◊
Lexicographic probability systems can now also be related to specific types of choice
functions, through Proposition 12: given a coherent set of desirable options D , the most
conservative coherent choice function CD whose binary choices are represented by
DC =D satisfies the convexity axiom C5 if and only if D is a lexicographic set of desirable
options. We will call C¯L ∶= {CD ∶D ∈ D¯L} the set of lexicographic choice functions.
Looking first at the most conservative coherent choice function that corresponds to
D and then checking whether it is ‘convex’, leads rather restrictively to lexicographic
choice functions, and is only possible for lexicographic D : convexity and choice based on
Walley–Sen maximality are only compatible for lexicographic binary choice. But suppose
we turn things around somewhat, first restrict our attention to all ‘convex’ coherent
choice functions from the outset, and then look at the most conservative such choice
function that makes the same binary choices as present in some given D :
inf{C ∈ C¯ ∶C satisfies Axiom C5 and DC =D}.
We infer from Proposition 4 that this infimum is still ‘convex’ and coherent. It will, of
course, no longer be lexicographic, unless D is. The following proposition tells us it still
is an infimum of lexicographic choice functions.
Proposition 25. Consider an arbitrary coherent set of desirable options D . The most
conservative coherent choice function C that satisfies Axiom C5 and DC =D is the infimum
of all lexicographic choice functions CD′ with D′ in D¯L such that D ⊆D′:
inf{C ∈ C¯ ∶C satisfies Axiom C5 and DC =D} = inf{CD′ ∶D′ ∈ D¯L and D ⊆D′}.
Proof. Denote the choice function on the left-hand side by Cleft, and the one on the right-
hand side by Cright. Both are coherent, and so by Axiom C4b completely characterised by
the option sets from which 0 is chosen. Consider any A inQ0, then we have to show that
0 ∈Cleft({0}∪ A)⇔ 0 ∈Cright({0}∪ A).
For the direct implication, we assume that 0 ∈Cleft({0}∪ A), meaning that there is
some C∗ in C¯ that satisfies Axiom C5, DC∗ = D and 0 ∈C∗({0}∪ A). We have to prove
that there is some D∗ in D¯L such that D ⊆ D∗ and D∗ ∩ A = ∅ [by Proposition 11],
and we will do so by constructing a suitable lexicographic probability system, by a
repeated application of an appropriate version of the separating hyperplane theorem
[Theorem 20], as in the proof of Theorem 23.
To prepare for this, we prove that posi({0}∪ A)∩D =∅. Indeed, assume ex absurdo
that posi({0}∪A)∩D ≠∅, so there is some f ∈D such that f ∈ posi({0}∪A). Then there
is some λ inR>0 such that g ∶=λ f ∈CH({0}∪A). Let A′ ∶= A∪{g}, so {0}∪A′ ⊆CH({0}∪
A), whence 0 ∈ C∗({0}∪ A′) by Axiom C5, if we recall that 0 ∈ C∗({0}∪ A). But f ∈ D
implies that g ∈D , and since DC∗ =D , also that g ∈DC∗ , or equivalently, 0 ∈R∗({0, g}),
by Proposition 11. Version (4) of Axiom C3a then guarantees that 0 ∈ R∗({0}∪ A′), a
contradiction.
It follows from this observation that we can apply Theorem 20 to show that there is
some non-zero linear functionalΛ1 onL such that
Λ1( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in posi({0}∪ A) andΛ1( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D . (20)
[Apply Theorem 20 withB =L(X ),W2 = posi({0}∪A) andW1 =D∪{0}, then int(W1)∩W2 =∅ since int(W1) ⊆ D , and 0 ∈W1 ∩W2.] Its kernel kerΛ1 is an n −1-dimensional
linear space, where n is the dimension ofL(X )—the cardinality ofX . Since both D and
kerΛ1 are convex cones, their intersection kerΛ1∩D is either empty or a convex cone.
When kerΛ1∩D =∅, we let ` ∶= 1, and stop.
26 ARTHUR VAN CAMP, GERT DE COOMAN, AND ENRIQUE MIRANDA
When kerΛ1∩D ≠∅, it follows from the same version of the separating hyperplane
theorem that there is some non-zero linear functionalΛ2 on kerΛ1 such that
Λ2( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in kerΛ1∩posi({0}∪ A) andΛ2( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in kerΛ1∩D .
[Apply Theorem 20 with B = kerΛ1,W2 = posi({0}∪ A)∩kerΛ1 andW1 = (kerΛ1∩D)∪{0}, then int(W1)∩W2 =∅ sinceW2 ⊆ posi({0}∪A) and int(W1) ⊆D , and 0 ∈W1∩W2.]
kerΛ2 is a n−2-dimensional linear space. As before, D ∩kerΛ2 is either empty or a non-
empty convex cone. If it is empty, let ` ∶= 2; otherwise, repeat the same procedure over
and over again, leading to successive non-zero linear functionals Λk on kerΛk−1 such
that
Λk( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in kerΛk−1∩posi({0}∪ A) andΛk( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in kerΛk−1∩D ,
(21)
until eventually we get to the first k such that D ∩kerΛk =∅, and then let ` ∶= k and stop.
We are guaranteed to stop after at most n repetitions, since kerΛn is the 0-dimensional
linear space {0}, for which D ∩kerΛn =∅. For the last functionalΛ`, we have that
Λ`( f ) > 0 for all f in D ∩kerΛ`−1. (22)
To see this, recall that by construction Λ`( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D ∩ kerΛ`−1, and that
D ∩kerΛ` =∅.
In this fashion we obtain ` linear functionalsΛ1, . . . ,Λ`, each defined on the kernel of
the previous functional—except for the domainL(X ) ofΛ1. We now show that we can
turn theΛ1, . . . ,Λ` into expectation operators: positive and normalised linear functionals
on the linear space L(X ). Indeed, consider their respective extensions Γ2, . . . , Γ` toL(X ) from Lemma 22, and let Γ1 ∶=Λ1. They satisfy Γk(1) > 0 for all k in {1, . . . ,`}; see
Proposition 15 and Lemma 22(ii). Now consider the real linear functionals on L(X )
defined by Ek( f ) ∶= Γk( f )/Γk(1) for all k in {1, . . . ,`} and f in L(X ). It is obvious from
Lemma 22(i) that these linear functionals are normalised and positive, and therefore
expectation operators onL(X ). Indeed each Ek is the expectation operator associated
with the mass function pk defined by pk(x) ∶= Ek(I{x}) for all x in X . In this way, p ∶=(p1, . . . , p`) defines a lexicographic probability system.
We now prove that p has no non-trivial Savage-null events, using Proposition 17.
Assume ex absurdo that there is some x∗ in X such that pk(x∗) = Ek(I{x∗}) = 0 for all
k in {1, . . . ,`}. Then I{x∗} ∈ kerΓ1 = kerΛ1 and I{x∗} ∈ Γk for all k in {2, . . . ,`}. Invoke
Lemma 22(iii) to find that I{x∗} ∈ kerΛ1 ∩kerΓ2 = kerΛ2. Repeated application of this
same lemma eventually leads us to conclude that I{x∗} ∈ kerΛ`−1 and I{x∗} ∈ kerΛ`.
Since also I{x∗} ∈D and hence I{x∗} ∈D ∩kerΛ`−1 [Axiom D2], Equation (22) implies that
Λ`(I{x∗}) > 0, a contradiction.
If we now let D∗ ∶= { f ∈L(X ) ∶ 0 <L (E1( f ), . . . ,E`( f ))}, then D∗ ∈ D¯L by Theorem 23.
If we can show that D ⊆ D∗ and A ∩D∗ =∅, we are done. So first, consider any f in D .
ThenΛ1( f ) ≥ 0 by Equation (20). IfΛ1( f ) > 0 then also E1( f ) > 0 by Lemma 22(ii), and
therefore f ∈ D∗. If Λ1( f ) = 0 then Λ2( f ) ≥ 0 by Equation (21). If Λ2( f ) > 0 then also
E2( f ) > 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv), and therefore f ∈D∗. We can go on in this way until we
get to the first k for whichΛk( f ) > 0, and therefore also Ek( f ) > 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv),
whence therefore f ∈ D∗. We are guaranteed to find such a k because we infer from
Equation (22) thatΛ`( f ) > 0. This shows that indeed D ⊆D∗.
Secondly, consider any f in A . Then Λ1( f ) ≤ 0 by Equation (20). If Λ1( f ) < 0 then
also E1( f ) < 0 by Lemma 22(ii), and therefore f ∉ D∗. If Λ1( f ) = 0 then Λ2( f ) ≤ 0 by
Equation (21). If Λ2( f ) < 0 then also E2( f ) < 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv), and therefore
f ∉ D∗. If we go on in this way, only two things can happen: either there is a first k for
whichΛk( f ) < 0, and therefore also Ek( f ) < 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv), whence therefore
f ∉D∗. Or we find thatΛk( f ) ≤ 0, and therefore also Ek( f ) ≤ 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv), for
all k ∈ {1, . . . ,`}, whence again f ∉D∗. This shows that indeed A∩D∗ =∅.
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For the converse implication, assume that 0 ∈ Cright({0}∪ A). We must prove that
there is some C˜ in C¯ that satisfies Axiom C5, DC˜ =D and 0 ∈ C˜({0}∪ A). We claim that
C˜ ∶= Cright does the job. Because we know by assumption that 0 ∈ Cright({0}∪ A), and
from Propositions 12 and 4 that Cright is coherent and satisfies Axiom C5, it only remains
to prove that DCright = D . To this end, consider any f in L(X ) and recall the following
equivalences:
f ∈DCright ⇔ 0 ∈Rright({0, f }) [Equation (11)]⇔ (∀D′ ∈ D¯L)(D ⊆D′⇒ 0 ∈RD′({0, f })) [definition of inf]⇔ (∀D′ ∈ D¯L)(D ⊆D′⇒ f ∈D′) [Proposition 11]⇔ f ∈D , [Proposition 14 and Dˆ ⊆ D¯L]
which completes the proof. 
As a consequence of this result, we also have that, for any coherent set of desirable
options D ,
inf{C ∈ C¯ ∶C satisfies Axiom C5 and D ⊆DC} = inf{CD′ ∶D′ ∈ D¯L and D ⊆D′}.
6. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
One of the advantages of lexicographic probability systems is that they are more
informative than single probability measures, and that they allow us to deal with some
of the issues that arise when conditioning on events of probability zero. This is also the
underlying idea behind some imprecise probability models, such as sets of desirable
gambles. In this paper, we have investigated the connection between the two models,
by means of the more general theory of coherent choice functions. We have shown that
lexicographic probability systems correspond to the convexity axiom that was considered
by Seidenfeld et al. when considering choice functions on horse lotteries. The study of
this axiom has led to the consideration of what we have called lexicographic sets of
desirable gambles.
In addition, we have also discussed the connection between our notion of coherent
choice functions on abstract vectors, and the earlier notion for horse lotteries, developed
mostly by Seidenfeld et al. (2010). We have proved that by defining choice functions
on arbitrary vector spaces—something which also proves useful when studying the
implications of an indifference assessment (Van Camp et al., 2017)—we can include
choice functions on horse lotteries as a particular case. This allows us in particular
to formulate our results for that framework. Note, nevertheless, that there are some
differences between Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010) approach and ours, due to the rationality
axioms considered and also to the fact that they deal with possibly infinite (but closed)
sets of options, whereas our model assumes that choices are always made between finite
sets of alternatives. It would be interesting to investigate the extent to which our results
can be generalised to infinite option sets.
One of the advantages of Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010) approach is that it leads to a repre-
sentation theorem, in the sense that any coherent choice function can be obtained as
the infimum of an arbitrary family of more informative convex coherent choice func-
tions that essentially correspond to probability mass functions. Based on the results and
conclusions derived here, it seems natural to wonder if a similar result can be estab-
lished in our framework. Unfortunately, the answer to this question is negative: it turns
out that in addition to convexity we need another axiom, which we have called weak
Archimedeanity. With this extra axiom, at least for binary possibility spaces, it turns out a
similar representation result can be proved: every such choice function is an infimum
of its lexicographic dominating choice functions, showing the importance of a study of
lexicographic choice functions also from another angle of perspective. The observation
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that we need an Archimedean axiom is in agreement with Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010) need
of their Archimedean axiom, which is—-unlike our weak Archimedeanity—difficult to
join with desirability. We intend to report on these results elsewhere.
On the other hand, we would also like to combine our results with the discussion by
Van Camp et al. (2017), and investigate indifference and conditioning for the special case
of lexicographic choice functions. In particular, this should allow us to link our work
with Blume et al.’s (1991) discussion of conditioning lexicographic probabilities. In this
context, Benavoli et al. (2017) have recently made a similar connection between sets of
desirable gambles and sets of lexicographic probabilities. Given our characterisation
of the special subclass of lexicographic sets of desirable options (or gambles for that
matter)—those sets of desirable gambles that are representable by a single lexicographic
probability—, we believe that exploring this might provide additional insight into this
relation. Finally, it would be of obvious interest to extend our results in Section 5 to
lexicographic probability systems defined on infinite spaces.
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